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Abstract
This paper examines distinctive discourse properties of preposed negative yes/no
questions (NPQs), such as Isn’t Jane coming too?. Unlike with other yes/no ques-
tions, using an NPQ ∼p? invariably conveys a bias toward a particular answer, where
the polarity of the bias is opposite of the polarity of the question: using the neg-
ative question ∼p? invariably expresses that the speaker previously expected the
positive answer p to be correct. A prominent approach— what I call the context-
management approach, developed most extensively by Romero and Han (Linguistics
and Philosophy, 27, 609-658 2004)— attempts to capture speaker expectation biases
by treating NPQs fundamentally as epistemic questions about the proper discourse
status of a proposition. I raise challenges for existing context-managing accounts to
provide more adequate formalizations of the posited context-managing content, its
implementation in the compositional semantics and discourse dynamics, and its role
in generating the observed biases. New data regarding discourse differences between
NPQs and associated epistemic modal questions are introduced. I argue that we can
capture the roles of NPQs in expressing speakers’ states of mind and managing the
discourse common ground without positing special context-managing operators or
treating NPQs as questions directly about the context. I suggest that we treat the oper-
ator introduced with preposed negation as having an ordinary semantics of epistemic
necessity, though lexically associated with a general kind of endorsing use observed
with modal expressions. The expressive and context-managing roles of NPQs are
explained in terms of a general kind of discourse-oriented use of context-sensitive
language. The distinctive expectation biases and discourse properties observed with
NPQs are derived from the proposed semantics and a general principle of Discourse
Relevance.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines certain distinctive discourse properties of yes/no questions with
preposed negation — negative polar questions (NPQs) — such as (1).
(1) Isn’t Jane coming to the party later?
Unlike with positive yes/no questions, uttering an NPQ such as (1) necessarily con-
veys the speaker’s prior expectation that the positive answer is correct (Ladd [33],
Bu¨ring and Gunlogson [10], Romero and Han [57]) — here, that Jane is coming to
the party:
(2) [Context: We’re wondering who is coming to the party. A mentions that John
is coming. S happens to know that Jane is good friends with John, and so is
likely to come. S says:]
a. Isn’t Jane coming too?
b. Is Jane coming too? (Positive speaker expectation)
(3) [Context: We’re wondering who is coming to the party. A mentions that John
is coming. We have no idea if Jane was invited, if she is friends with John,
what her plans are, etc. S says:]
a. #Isn’t Jane coming too?
b. Is Jane coming too? (Neutral speaker expectation)
(4) [Context: We’re wondering who is coming to the party. A mentions that
John is coming. S happens to know that Jane has an important competition
tomorrow, and so is unlikely to come. S says:]
a. #Isn’t Jane coming too?
b. #Is Jane coming too? (Negative speaker expectation)
One can felicitously utter Is Jane coming too? (j?) without having a prior expecta-
tion about whether Jane is coming; and if one does have an expectation, it is toward
the answer whose polarity corresponds to the polarity of the question, i.e. the pos-
itive answer j that Jane is coming. By contrast, the polarity of the NPQ Isn’t Jane
coming too? (∼j?) is negative, but using ∼j? still conveys an expectation toward the
positive answer j . Indeed, using the NPQ is infelicitous if the speaker is neutral about
whether j or would have expected ¬j . The challenge is to explain (a) why using an
NPQ necessarily conveys an expectation about the correct answer, and (b) why this
expectation is toward the positive answer, the answer whose polarity is opposite of
the polarity of the question.1
1I use p, q, etc. multiply as variables and schematic letters for positive sentence radicals/TPs, and for the
possible-worlds propositions they denote (sets of worlds or their characteristic functions). Likewise I use ¬
both for clausal negation and in the metalanguage for set complementation. I use ∼ for preposed negation
when abbreviating NPQs, e.g. ∼j? for Isn’t Jane coming?. I use ‘positive/negative answer’ for the answer
whose polarity is positive/negative; for both positive and negative polar questions, a positive answer is an
answer that implies p, and a negative answer is an answer that implies ¬p. A positive/negative answer, in
this sense, may or may not correspond to an answer with a positive/negative polarity particle (yes/no).
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A prominent approach — what I will call the context-management
approach— attempts to capture the data regarding speaker expectation biases by
treating NPQs ∼p? fundamentally as epistemic questions about the proper discourse
status of a proposition p (esp. Romero and Han [57], also Romero [54–56] and Repp
[49–51]). Whereas ordinary polar questions are questions about the subject matter
of the discourse, NPQs are treated as questions about the discourse itself — roughly
put, questions about whether it’s certain that p is to be added to the discourse com-
mon ground, the body of information taken for granted for purposes of conversation
(Stalnaker [72, 73]). Preposed negation contributes a context-managing opera-
tor — an operator that directly targets an element of the representation of context.
NPQs afford a conventional linguistic means for directly managing the discourse
common ground.
This paper critically examines the context-management approach to NPQs. The
central aims are threefold: first, to raise empirical and theoretical challenges for
previous context-management accounts; second, to provide new data relevant for the-
orizing about NPQs and biased questions more generally; third, to introduce a novel
strategy for capturing distinctive discourse properties of NPQs in an operator-based
account. I argue that we can capture the intuitive role of NPQs in managing the con-
text, but without positing special context-managing operators or treating NPQs as
fundamentally about the context. The proposed epistemic operator account provides
a more empirically adequate, explanatory treatment of the use of NPQs in expressing
speakers’ states of mind and managing the common ground.
An overview is as follows. Section 2 raises challenges for existing context-
management accounts, focusing primarily on Romero and Han [57] (“R&H”). I
begin with worries concerning the technical implementations of the posited context-
managing operators, and the proposed derivations of speaker expectation biases with
NPQs. These worries raise general challenges for any account which analyzes NPQs
in terms of context-managing operators. Principal challenges include to explain lin-
guistic and discourse differences between NPQs and associated epistemic modal
questions, and between NPQs and recognized devices of attitude-expression and
context-management. These differences haven’t been observed in previous literature.
The paper’s central constructive project is taken up in Section 3. Section 3
argues that we can capture intuitions motivating context-management accounts with-
out positing special context-managing operators or treating NPQs as fundamentally
about the context. I suggest that we treat the operator introduced with preposed
negation as having an ordinary semantics of epistemic necessity, though lexically
associated with a general kind of endorsing use observed with modal expressions.
The expressive and context-managing roles of NPQs are explained in terms of an
independently attested kind of discourse-oriented use of context-sensitive language
(Silk [63, 65, 67]). I show how NPQs’ distinctive expectation biases and discourse
properties can be derived using two additional independently motivated pieces of
apparatus: first, a distinction between a possibility’s being compatible with a body
of information and its being live; second, a general principle of discourse relevance,
generalized from previous literature. The proposed epistemic operator account dis-
tinguishes the interpretations of NPQs and associated epistemic modal questions, and
predicts their contrasting biases and discourse properties.
A. Silk
Section 4 concludes and raises several issues for future research. Section 4.1 com-
pares the account from Section 3 with alternative speech-act approaches to NPQs.
Section 4.2 revisits R&H’s assumption that preposing negation introduces an addi-
tional operator, and outlines an alternative implementation which treats preposed
negation as itself having a modal semantics. Section 4.3 examines answer patterns
with NPQs.
Several remarks on the scope of the discussion are in order. First, I have charac-
terized the bias intuitively associated with NPQs as an expectation that a particular
answer is correct. As has been observed, this expectation may be partly normative.
Though the speaker in (5) may not have previously thought it likely that the embed-
ded proposition p was true, she still conveys a bias (expectation, preference) toward
continuations of the discourse in which p is accepted.
(5) Aren’t you ashamed of yourselves?
(Huddleston and Pullum [25, 880, 883–884])
My talk of an “expectation bias” toward a particular answer may be understood
broadly to cover cases such as these.
Second, I focus on polar questions with preposed negation — in English, questions
of the form Aux+n’t p?. Questions with non-preposed negation needn’t express a
prior expectation that the positive answer is correct; they can be unbiased, and they
can express a prior expectation in the negative answer ¬p (see n. 1):2
(6) [Context: S is interviewing a professional athlete A about A’s training regi-
men. S has no prior beliefs about A’s schedule/habits. S says:]
Tell us about your training. Do you wake up early?. . .
a. #Don’t you eat sweets?
b. Do you not eat sweets? (Neutral speaker expectation)
(7) [Context: S is interviewing a professional athlete A about A’s training regi-
men. Vegetable and dessert platters are on the table. S thinks it unlikely that
A would have sweets during training; indeed, A is having vegetables but no
desserts. S says:]
Tell us about your training. I notice you’re just eating the vegetables. . .
a. #Don’t you eat sweets during the season?
b. Do you not eat sweets during the season?
(Negative speaker expectation)
Third, it is common following Ladd [33] to distinguish “outer-negation” and
“inner-negation” readings of NPQs — as R&H put it, readings which “double-
check” p, and readings which “double-check” ¬p, respectively. The readings can
2Romero and Han [57] observe that this contrast between preposed and non-preposed negative polar ques-
tions arises across languages. Generally put, the bias associated with NPQs is a bias toward the answer
expressed by the material under the preposed negation. I put NPQs with both preposed and non-preposed
negation aside. Such questions exhibit the distinctive properties of preposed negative questions but with
opposite polarity; for instance, they invariably convey the speaker’s prior expectation in the negative
answer — e.g., in Isn’t Jane not coming?, that Jane is not coming.
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be distinguished with positive vs. negative polarity items, and they differ in their
constraints on the prior context:
(8) A: John just got here, so we’re all ready to go to the party.
S: Isn’t Jane coming too? (outer-negation reading)
(9) A: John isn’t coming to the party. So no one from our class will be there.
S: Isn’t Jane coming either? (inner-negation reading)
Some have argued that inner-negation readings are ordinary questions about whether
¬p, and that only outer-negation readings call for a distinctive linguistic represen-
tation (Asher and Reese [2], Reese [48]). For this reason I focus exclusively on
outer-negation readings — readings in which positive polarity items are licensed.
Hereafter by ‘NPQ’ I will mean “polar question with preposed negation that licenses
positive polarity items” (written ∼p?).
Fourth, NPQs aren’t the only questions that seem to “bias” or highlight one answer
over others. There are also rising declaratives (questions with declarative syntax
and rising prosody; Gunlogson [21, 22], Trinh [85]), incredulity-contour declaratives
(questions with declarative syntax and fall-rise prosody; Reese [48], Krifka [31]),
and reversed-polarity tag questions (Sadock [60]), among others (see also Malamud
and Stephenson [38]). I leave open how the account of NPQs in Section 3 might be
extended to other kinds of biased questions.
Fifth, Bu¨ring and Gunlogson [10] observe that polar questions are also associated
with a “contextual evidence bias”: Using a positive polar question p? is infelicitous
if there is (salient, compelling) evidence for ¬p in the discourse context; and using a
negative polar question is infelicitous if there is (salient, compelling) evidence for p:
(10) [Context: A enters S’s windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet
raincoat. S says:]
a. Is it raining outside?
b. #Is it sunny outside?
c. #Is it not raining?
d. #Isn’t it raining? (cf. Bu¨ring and Gunlogson [10, ex. 18])
The polarity of the contextual evidence bias parallels the polarity of the question.
What is interesting about the speaker expectation bias is that with NPQs, unlike
with positive polarity questions (or non-preposed negative questions), the polarity
of the bias is opposite to the polarity of the question. It’s this speaker expectation
bias — the bias reflecting the speaker’s individual prior expectation about the correct
answer — that will concern us here.
2 NPQs and Context-Managing Operators
This section critically examines previous context-management accounts of NPQs.
These accounts agree in understanding NPQs fundamentally as questions about the
proper discourse status of a proposition; and they agree in implementing this idea by
interpreting NPQs with respect to a context-managing operator — an operator which
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directly targets an element in the representation of the discourse such as the Common
Ground (CG). In Romero and Han [57] (also Romero [54, 55]) the operator is treated
as a covert operator VERUM contributed by the preposing of negation; in Repp [51]
(also Romero [56]) the operator is treated as an operator FALSUM contributed by
the negation itself. To fix ideas I focus on the VERUM-based account in Romero and
Han [57] (R&H), as it provides the most extensive treatment of speaker expectation
biases. I return briefly to Repp’s FALSUM-based account in Section 2.5.
2.1 Romero & Han: VERUM and Bias. Overview
R&H hypothesize that VERUM — the putative context-managing operator in the inter-
pretation of NPQs — is also introduced by polarity focus and epistemic really, as
in (11)–(12). R&H’s semantics for VERUM is in (13), abbreviated ‘FOR-SURE-
CGx’ — where x is a variable contextually identified with the speaker/addressee,
CGw is the common ground of the conversation in w, Epix(w) is x’s epistemic alter-
natives (the set of worlds compatible with what x knows) in w, and Convx(w) is the
set of worlds where all of x’s conversational goals in w are satisfied.
(11) [IS]F Jane coming?
(12) Is Jane really coming?
(13) VERUMigx/i
= λpst .λws . ∀w′ ∈ Epix(w) : ∀w′′ ∈ Convx(w′) :p ∈ CGw′′
= FOR-SURE-CGx (Romero and Han [57, 627])
VERUMi p is true, on R&H’s semantics, iff for all of x’s epistemic alternatives w′, p
is in the discourse common ground in every world w′′ in which all of x’s conversa-
tional goals in w′ are satisfied (n. 1). Informally, “VERUM is used not to assert [p, or]
that the speaker is entirely certain about the truth of p, but to assert that the speaker
is certain that p should be added to the Common Ground (CG)” [57, 627].
R&H posit that the non-canonical syntax of preposing negation introduces
VERUM. The denotation for an NPQ ∼p? thus yields an “epistemically unbalanced”
partition between certainty that p should be added to the CG and any other credence
that p should be added to the CG, as reflected in (15). A positive polar question
p?, by contrast, yields a “balanced” partition between p and ¬p, as in (16). (Q is
the question operator, given a familiar partition semantics such as (14), and j is
the proposition that Jane is coming. For convenience I follow R&H in using both
function-based and set-based denotations for questions. I often leave implicit the
index i and assignment mapping i to x. See n. 1.)
(14) Q = λpst .λws .λqst . q = p ∨ q = ¬p
= λpst .λws .{p,¬p}
(15) a. Isn’t Jane coming (too)?
b. LF: [Q not [VERUM [Jane is coming (too)]]]
c. (15b)(w0)
= λq . q = FOR-SURE-CGx j ∨ q = ¬FOR-SURE-CGx j
= {FOR-SURE-CGx j,¬FOR-SURE-CGx j}
Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions
(16) a. Is Jane coming?
b. LF: [Q [Jane is coming]]
c. (16b)(w0)
= λq . q = j ∨ q = ¬j
= {j,¬j} (adapting [57, 627–628, 636–637])
R&H explain speaker expectation biases with NPQs ∼p? in two stages. First,
the existence of an expectation bias is explained as a (non-cancellable) implica-
ture arising from (i) the epistemically unbalanced partition generated by VERUM
about the discourse move of adding p to the CG, and (ii) a posited (non-violable)
pragmatic principle, (17), governing discourse moves about other discourse moves
(“meta-conversational moves”) (cf. [57, 609n.1]).
(17) Principle of Economy:
Do not use a meta-conversational move [i.e., context-managing operator]
unless necessary (to resolve epistemic conflict or to ensure Quality). [57, 629]
By R&H’s Principle of Economy, uttering an NPQ ∼p? is felicitous only if the
speaker has reason to question whether p should be added to the CG — e.g., if the
speaker disagrees with a previous assertion about whether p (to resolve epistemic
conflict), or if the speaker has views about whether p but lacks sufficient grounds to
assert it (to avoid violating the Maxim of Quality). R&H conclude that a cooperative
speaker will use an NPQ only if she has a prior epistemic bias about p.3
Next, R&H explain the positive polarity of the expectation bias — the bias toward
the positive answer — by invoking the notion of a question’s “intent.” Following
Bolinger [7], R&H observe that a request for help can be made by asking the positive
polar question in (18a), but not by asking the negative polar question in (18b) or the
alternative question in (18c).
(18) Request for help:
a. Will you please help me?
b. #Will you please not help me?
c. #Will you please help me or not?
(Bolinger [7, 89]; Romero and Han [57, 642])
Though R&H don’t provide a formal account of intent, the intuitive idea is that
the “pronounced cell” of a polar question — the cell expressed by the question rad-
ical — sets the “topic” and reflects which proposition “the speaker is interested in
3“Why is the unbalanced partition . . . inappropriate in contexts with no previous bias? The unbalanced par-
tition would violate the Principle of Economy in [(17)]. For if the addressee uttered p or ¬p, the unbiased
speaker would have no reason not to execute the instruction of adding p or ¬p to the CG . . . and hence
the meta-conversational move [invoking an unbalanced partition] would be unjustified. Similarly . . . , if
p was relevant to the conversation but the speaker was completely unbiased between p or ¬p, the bal-
anced partition would be more economical and the unbalanced partition unmotivated” (Romero and Han
[57, 629]).
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pursuing a conversation about” (Romero and Han [57, 642]).4 The “intent” of a
polar question, for R&H’s purposes, is treated as the combination of the partition
denotation and which cell is pronounced, as in (19).
(19) “Intent” (denotation and pronounced cell) for ∼p?
{FOR-SURE-CGx p,¬FOR-SURE-CGx p}
The explanation of the bias toward the positive answer proceeds roughly as follows.
(A more detailed reconstruction is given in Section 2.4.) In uttering ∼p? the speaker
pronounces the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p of the question’s denotation. Pronouncing
the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p constitutes a request for possible grounds for doubting
p. Such a request would be infelicitous if the speaker was biased toward ¬p; after
all, if the speaker expected ¬p, she would already have reasons to doubt p. So, in
pronouncing the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p, the speaker “suggest[s] that p be added
to the Common Ground unless the addressee has reasons to doubt p” (Romero and
Han [57, 649]). Such a suggestion would be infelicitous if the speaker antecedently
expected ¬p, but felicitous if the speaker antecedently expected p. So, since an NPQ
is felicitous only if the speaker has some epistemic bias about p (as explained above),
this bias must be toward accepting the positive answer p. Or so R&H argue.
2.2 VERUM and Epistemic Predicates
The guiding intuition behind the context-management approach is that NPQs ∼p?
question the appropriateness of a certain discourse move: adding p to the CG.
The following subsections raise worries for R&H’s way of capturing this idea. I
begin with concerns about details of R&H’s implementation, followed by general
challenges for context-management accounts.
R&H observe that VERUM cannot be used interchangeably with “pure epistemic
expressions” (Romero and Han [57, 626]) such as be sure:
(20) [Context: S is a lawyer questioning a witness, A, who claims to have seen
Mrs. Rumpel the night of the crime. S wants to check A’s degree of certainty
about this, but without conveying disbelief. S asks:]
a. Are you sure that you saw Mrs. Rumpel leave the house that night?
b. #Did you really see Mrs. Rumpel leave the house that night?
c. #Didn’t you not see Mrs. Rumpel leave the house that night?
(Romero and Han [57, 626])
R&H’s semantics obscures such contrasts. Given common assumptions about
information-sharing discourse, R&H’s formalization predicts that VERUMi p and
i knows p are contextually equivalent in their truth-conditions.
According to (13), VERUMi p is true iff for all worlds w′ in x’s epistemic alterna-
tives, p is included in the CG in every world w′′ in which all of x’s conversational
4See van Rooy and Sˇafa´rˇova´ [58] for a decision-theoretic account which treats the pronounced cell as the
cell with greater conversational utility.
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goals in w′ are satisfied. A primary overarching goal of inquiry is to figure out how
things are — formally, to winnow down the context set CS (the set of worlds where
all the propositions in the CG are true) to a singleton set {w@} of the actual world
(Stalnaker [73], Roberts [52]). Let a transparent context be one in which the speak-
ers know that they are engaged in a cooperative information-sharing discourse and
know their discourse goals; and assume that if one knows p, then one knows that one
knows p — or, what may be weaker, that if one knows p, then one knows that one
bears R to p, where R is whatever attitude suffices for ensuring Quality (knowledge,
justified belief, etc.) (“introspection”). Then:
Proposition 1 For any transparent context c, VERUMi p is true in c (according
to (13)) iff i knows p is true in c
For the left-to-right direction: Given transparency, for any w′ in x’s epistemic alter-
natives and proposition q, if q ∈ CGw′′ for every w′′ ∈ Convx(w′), then q must be
true at w′. For if q is false at w′, then q /∈ CGw′′ for any w′′ ∈ Convx(w′), since a
discourse goal in w′ is to avoid adding falsehoods to the CG. So, if VERUMi p is true,
then p must be true at every world w′ in x’s epistemic alternatives, i.e. i knows p is
true. For the right-to-left direction: Suppose i knows p is true, so p is true at every w′
in x’s epistemic alternatives. Given introspection, x knows that x bears R to p, hence
x bears R to p in every such w′. So, given transparency, p is in the CG in every world
where all of x’s discourse goals in w′ are satisfied. So, VERUMi p is true. Putting
these points together: for any world in the context set, VERUMi p is true iff i knows
p is true. This obscures R&H’s claim that VERUM is a distinctive context-oriented
operator.
One might reply that, common idealizations notwithstanding, “transparent” con-
texts aren’t typical among actual discourses. Recall that R&H identify x “with the
addressee (or with the individual sum of the addressee and the speaker)” [57, 626]. If
the addressee has private information/knowledge that she wishes not to share, trans-
parency won’t hold. I leave the point as a challenge: to provide a more adequate
discourse framework or lexical entry for context-managing operators which clearly
distinguishes the interpretations of VERUM and ordinary epistemic attitude predi-
cates. In Section 3 I argue that we can capture the motivations for R&H’s (13) without
treating VERUM as a context-managing operator in the sense of Section 2.0.
2.3 VERUM and Expressive Content
One strategy for distinguishing the contextual effects of context-managing opera-
tors would be to treat them as having some non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning.
Although R&H don’t consider such a move, Repp [49–51] and Romero [54–56] moti-
vate their accounts by exploiting apparent similarities between the posited context-
managing operators and recognized expressive/discourse-oriented devices — devices
which “have been argued to contribute not to the propositional content in the standard
way, but to the expressive meaning” (Romero [55]), including discourse particles,
epithets, speaker-oriented adverbs (e.g. Potts [46, 47], Gutzmann [23]). For instance,
Romero claims that really patterns with linguistic expressives (i) in not contributing
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to local truth-conditional content, as in (21)–(22) compared with obviously, and
(ii) in allowing direct affirmations/denials to target the embedded proposition, as in
(23)–(24) compared with unfortunately.
(21) [Context: John and Mary made the deal that they would pretend to be in
love. In reality, they do not love each other nor care about each other’s love.]
a. John is upset because it is obvious that Mary doesn’t love him. (true)
b. #John is upset because obviously Mary doesn’t love him. (false)
(22) Kate didn’t show up because she really couldn’t make it.
(23) A: John, unfortunately, lost the election.
S: That’s not true.
⇒ ¬(John lost)
* ¬(it is unfortunate that John lost)
(24) A: This professor really is very smart.
S: That’s not true. (Romero [55, exs. 39–41, 43])
Romero [54–56] appeals to such similarities to explain why answers to really-
questions and NPQs ∼p? seem to target the embedded proposition p, rather than the
context-oriented propositions (¬)FOR-SURE-CGx p which provide the predicted
meaning of the question.
(25) S: Did Mary really visit Sue?
A: Yes (. . . , she did).
A′: No (. . . , she didn’t).
(26) S: Didn’t Mary visit Sue?
A: Yes (. . . , she did).
A′: No (. . . , she didn’t). (Romero [55, ex. 34])
Formally, Romero allocates expressive/context-managing content to a separate
dimension of meaning, reflected in the revised lexical entry for VERUM in (27).
The contribution of the question morpheme Q is assumed to be reproduced in both
dimensions, per (28), yielding the revised meaning for VERUM-questions in (29).5
(27) a. truth-conditional content: VERUM = λpst . p
b. context-managing content: VERUMCM = λpst . FOR-SURE-CGx p
(28) a. truth-conditional content: Q = λpst . {p,¬p}
b. context-managing content: QCM = λpst . {p,¬p}
(29) really q?
a. Q [VERUM q] = {q,¬q}
5I use · for expressions’ truth-conditional content (Romero’s “at-issue content”), and ·CM for expres-
sions’ context-managing content. I follow Romero in grouping non-truth-conditional meanings associated
with expressives and context-managing operators under a general heading of “context-managing content.”
I return to answer patterns in Section 4.3.
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b. Q [VERUM q]CM = {FOR-SURE-CGx q,¬FOR-SURE-CGx q}
(adapting Romero [56, exs. 23, 26, 33])
So, assuming that answer particles target truth-conditional content, the yes/no-
answers in (25) are predicted to target the embedded proposition that Mary visited
Sue, which constitutes the truth-conditional content of the complement of Q.
Central to Romero’s [56] revised account are the assumptions that context-
managing content is targeted by “illocutionary operators,” such as Q, and not
by truth-conditional operators. The former generalization is invoked in explaining
speaker expectation biases, which are sensitive to the context-managing content; the
latter generalization is invoked in explaining answer patterns, which are not. Both
generalizations are problematic. First, there are cases where context-managing con-
tent contributes to local truth-conditional content. In (30) S’s contingency planning
about whether to take the umbrella doesn’t depend on the fact of whether it will
rain, but on the subjective possibility of rain; the contributions of epistemic really
and maybe/perhaps figure in characterizing the hypothetical scenarios entertained
with S’s conditionals. In (31) the expectation biases associated with VERUM — which
Romero derives from the context-managing content — are commitments of the
attitude subject.
(30) S: I wonder how the weather will be at the game. I hate getting caught
without an umbrella.
A: It looks fine out, at least for now. And I don’t want to lug that thing
around for no reason.
S: If it’s really not going to rain, I won’t take the umbrella. But if
maybe/perhaps it will, let’s take it just in case.
(31) a. John wondered whether Jane was really coming to the party.
b. John wondered whether Jane wasn’t coming to the party too.
In contrast, the context-managing content of linguistic expressives typically projects
and fails to have local effect, as in (32)–(34) (e.g. Potts [46, 47], Tonhauser et al.
[83]). The negative attitude associated with that bastard in (32) would typically be
attributed to the speaker and not to the subject. (33) isn’t questioning whether Kresge
is a jerk, whether one dislikes Kresge, etc.
(32) Sue believes that bastard Kresge should be fired. (#I think he’s a good guy.)
(Potts [47, ex. 10])
(33) Should that bastard Kresge be fired?
(34) Everyone else loves Kresge. If that bastard gets promoted, I’ll quit.
Suppose for simplicity that the context-managing content of that bastard Kresge
should be fired is that one dislikes Kresge, abbreviated NEG(K). The observed
context-managing content of (33) isn’t {NEG(K),¬NEG(K)} as predicted by
Romero’s semantics, but NEG(K). Contrary to (28), it isn’t in general the case that
context-managing content embeds under the question operator Q.
The contrasts between VERUM and linguistic expressives in projection behav-
ior and local effects are unexpected if their (alleged) context-managing contents
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are implemented in the same kind of way. As in Section 2.2, the worry needn’t be
devastating. Although Romero assimilates the non-truth-conditional contributions of
VERUM, epistemic adverbs, discourse particles, etc. under a heading of “context-
managing content,” there may be reasons to distinguish them in ways relevant to the
compositional semantics (cf. Tonhauser et al. [83], Gutzmann [23]). The challenge
remains: to implement the alleged context-managing contribution of (e.g.) VERUM
in a more adequate formal semantics, and to do so in a way that captures relevant
similarities and differences with recognized expressive/discourse-oriented devices.
We should be cautious in assigning theoretical significance to intuitions about
attitude-expression and context-management. The neophyte might wonder: “Don’t
all speech-acts express speakers’ (epistemic) attitudes — not just about the world,
but about the context, one’s interlocutors, and how the discourse should evolve?6
Given any plausible norm of assertion (Brown and Cappelen [9]) and force rule
(semantic or pragmatic), even a simple assertion that p characteristically expresses
the speaker’s belief that p, the speaker’s assumption that p is news to the addressee,
the speaker’s goal of adding p to the CG, etc. (cf. Stalnaker [73]). If foundational
expressivism in philosophy of language is correct, then the meaning of all language,
even descriptive language, is to be explained fundamentally in terms of speakers’
states of mind (e.g. Gibbard [19, 20], Silk [64]). If we aren’t assuming markers for
attitude-expression/context-management in the structure of sentences generally, why
then with really or NPQs?” There are of course empirical grounds for distinguish-
ing the expressive/context-managing roles of certain constructions — e.g., regarding
projection, effects on local content, and embedding behavior, as above. But, adapt-
ing a point from Partee and Borschev [44, 72, 103], “we cannot use ‘intuitions’ of
[expressivity/context-management] as a good guide to whether something is ‘really’ ”
a linguistic expressive, in the sense of an expression with a distinctive category
of projective content. Absent clear confirming evidence with respect to established
diagnostics, it’s worth reexamining whether NPQs’ apparent expressive/context-
managing roles might be derived from more general features of context and linguistic
acts (Section 3).
2.4 NPQs, Epistemic Questions, and “Intent”
This section examines more closely R&H’s derivation of speaker expectation biases
with NPQs — R&H’s derivation of how using an NPQ ∼p? invariably conveys that
the speaker previously expected the positive answer p to be correct. Recall that cen-
tral to R&H’s explanation is the notion of a question’s “intent,” as determined by
the question’s partition denotation and which cell in the partition is pronounced. It is
6Cf. “Discourse particles in the narrow sense are used in order to organize the discourse by expressing the
speaker’s epistemic attitude towards the propositional content of an utterance, or to express a speaker’s
assumptions about the epistemic states of his or her interlocutors concerning a particular proposition”
(Zimmermann [94, 2012], emphasis added; cf. Repp [51, 231, 240]).
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worth quoting R&H’s account of the intent of an NPQ ∼p?, and how it generates the
bias toward the positive answer, largely in full:
Since the pronounced cell is the ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p cell, the intent of the
question is concerned with pursuing the topic “lack of complete certainty about
p” or “possible (weak or strong) doubts about p”. . . Since the intent of the
question is to ask the addressee to provide reasons — if any — to doubt p, . . . p
must be the original belief of the speaker, not vice-versa. If, contrary to fact, the
speaker believed ¬p to a high degree, the speaker would already have evidence
to doubt p. . . Therefore, [NPQs ∼p?] have the positive epistemic implicature
that the speaker believed p.
The “intent” of the question is to suggest that p be added to the Common
Ground unless the addressee has reasons to doubt p. This is a licit suggestion
if the speaker endorses p . . . but it violates the spirit of the Maxim of Quality if
the speaker believes ¬p. (Romero and Han [57, 646–647, 649])
One way of reconstructing R&H’s argument in these passages is as follows:
(35) i. Pronouncing the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p constitutes a request for
grounds for doubting p.
ii. Requesting grounds for doubting p would be contrary to one’s conver-
sational goals (e.g. contrary to Quantity or Quality), hence infelicitous,
if one initially expected ¬p.
iii. Using a question with an epistemically unbalanced partition would be
contrary to the Principle of Economy (17), hence infelicitous, if one
was neutral about whether p.
iv. So, using an NPQ ∼p?, pronouncing the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p,
is felicitous only if the speaker initially expected p. So, assuming
the speaker is cooperative, using an NPQ invariably conveys that the
speaker had a prior expectation toward p.
Premise (i) represents the assumption about the intent of an NPQ ∼p?. The crucial
claim is (ii): that requesting grounds for doubting p is infelicitous if one antecedently
expected ¬p.7 Since the speaker must have some prior epistemic bias about p, as per
7I am not sure what exactly R&H’s grounds are for (ii). The quoted passages suggest two lines of thought:
ii-a. If one initially expected ¬p, then one already has grounds for doubting p. So, requesting
grounds for doubting p would be contrary to the spirit of Quantity, hence infelicitous.
ii-b. In requesting grounds for doubting p one “suggest[s] that p be added to the Common Ground
unless the addressee has reasons to doubt p.” Such a suggestion would be contrary to the
spirit of Quality, hence infelicitous, if one initially expected ¬p.
(ii-b) takes as basic that requesting grounds for doubting p constitutes a defeasible suggestion that p be
added to the CG, whereas (ii-a) treats this as an implication of the independently derived positive speaker
expectation bias. We will see reasons for questioning both lines of support for (ii).
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(iii) established by R&H’s economy-based argument (Section 2.1), using an NPQ is
felicitous only if the speaker expected p. So, the argument concludes in (iv), NPQs
invariably carry a positive speaker expectation bias.
For the sake of argument I grant R&H’s assumption in (i) about the nature of
the act performed in pronouncing the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p with an NPQ ∼p?.8
Start with (iii), that NPQ LFs “give rise to unbalanced partitions, hence to epistemic
biases” (Romero [55, 12], emphasis added, [54, 3]; see also n. 3). Pace R&H, using
a question with an epistemically unbalanced partition is insufficient for conveying
an epistemic bias. S’s question Really heads? in (36) has the unbalanced partition
{FOR-SURE-CGx heads,¬FOR-SURE-CGx heads}; yet S gives equal credence to
heads and ¬heads.
(36) [Context: A and S are wondering whether to take a bet on a coin toss.]
A: I think the next coin flip will be heads. Let’s take the bet.
S: Is it really going to be heads? I think the coin is fair. I don’t think we
should take the bet.
(Unbalanced partition; No speaker expectation bias)
The epistemic possibility questions in (37) involve a choice between “a fine degree of
certainty” — certainty against p — and “any other degree of certainty” (Romero and
Han [57, 633, 628]); yet the questions needn’t convey that the speaker was expecting
a particular answer.
(37) [Context (=(3)): We’re wondering who is coming to the party. A says John
is coming. We have no idea if Jane was invited, if she’s friends with John,
what her plans are, etc. S says:]
a. Maybe/Perhaps/Possibly Jane is coming too?
b. Might Jane be coming too?
(Unbalanced partition; No speaker expectation bias)
It cannot be simply an epistemically unbalanced partition which explains that NPQs
invariably convey a speaker expectation bias.
Turn to (ii). Pace R&H, there needn’t be anything infelicitous in requesting rea-
sons for doubting a proposition p which one doubts oneself, or even expects is false.
Questions with epistemic possibility modals often have precisely this function.
(38) A: The butler is surely the killer.
S: But he has always seemed like such a nice guy. Might/Could it
have been someone else? (/Was it perhaps someone else?) Maybe the
gardener?
S asks whether someone other than the butler might be the killer, and raises the
possibility that it was the gardener. S requests to pursue grounds for doubting that
8Strictly speaking the intent of the NPQ with pronounced cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p should be glossed
as a request for grounds for doubting whether p should be added to the CG, rather than as a request for
grounds for doubting p. I ignore any differences between these acts.
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the butler is the killer precisely to express her prior expectation that the butler is not
the killer.
It is important to be clear about the dialectical import of the examples with epis-
temic modal questions. R&H’s claim in (ii) is a claim about the nature of the act of
requesting grounds for doubting a proposition p. There are various conventional and
non-conventional ways of performing such an act. One way, in some contexts, is by
uttering ♦¬p? (for some expression of epistemic possibility ♦). The act of request-
ing reasons for doubting a proposition p is compatible with merely having some
credence in p or expecting that p would be false.
Epistemic possibility questions also raise worries for the inference to (iv) regard-
ing the strength of the epistemic bias observed with NPQs. One may ask to examine
evidence against p because one has some credence in p but one doesn’t want the
possibility that ¬p to be hastily dismissed:
(39) Moore: My hands hurt.
Skeptic: Do we know you have hands? Maybe you don’t have hands and
you’re just a brain in a vat?
(40) Fred: God is dead.
Blaise: I too find theism hard to believe. But might God exist? Perhaps
God isn’t dead and is testing our faith?
In (40) Blaise isn’t prepared to rule out that they might ultimately have reason to
accept that God exists. In (39) Skeptic asks Maybe you don’t have hands? (♦¬h?),
requesting reasons for doubting h. Skeptic might intend to “pursu[e] the topic ‘lack
of complete certainty about [h]’ ” because she is committed and expects ¬h, or is
aporetic and neither expects h nor expects ¬h. Or she might simply be an earnest
epistemology student wanting to ensure that ¬h isn’t improperly ignored.
The challenge raised by epistemic modal questions can be pressed further. Though
the details of formal implementation are controversial, all parties agree that a princi-
pal use of epistemic modal expressions is to manage the set of live possibilities.9 In
such a use, accepting ♦¬p (e.g. perhaps ¬p) ensures that the CG is compatible with
¬p. Perhaps conventionally, perhaps non-conventionally, asking an epistemic possi-
bility question (“EPQ”) ♦¬p? delineates possible continuations of the discourse in
which ¬p is live and possible continuations in which ¬p is ruled out, and highlights
the former possibilities. These effects are the same effects conventionally associated
with ∼p? on R&H’s semantics and notion of intent. Yet the NPQ ∼p? and EPQ ♦¬p?
have opposite biases and discourse functions. Unlike the NPQ, the EPQ cannot be
used to disagree with a prior implication that ¬p (reflected in (41)), or to suggest p as
an answer to a relevant question (reflected in (42); cf. Romero and Han [57, ex. 27]).
(41) A: The butler is surely the killer. (⇒ ¬gardener)
S: Wasn’t it the gardener? Aux+n’t gardener?
9For alternative contextualist, relativist, expressivist, and dynamic approaches to capturing this function of
epistemic modals, see Veltman [88], Stephenson [77], Yalcin [92], MacFarlane [37], Silk [65], Swanson
[80]. I use ‘epistemic modal’ broadly for expressions of various categories notionally expressing epistemic
modality.
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S ′: #Was it maybe/possibly/perhaps not the gardener? (/Might/Could it have
been someone other than the gardener?) #♦¬gardener?
(42) [Context: Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:]
A: I’d like to send this paper out to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer
somebody who has experience with our regulations.
S: Hasn’t Frege reviewed for us? He’d be a good one.
S ′: #Maybe/Possibly/Perhaps Frege hasn’t reviewed for us? He’d be a
good one.
The act of requesting reasons for doubting p can express a prior expectation
against p, and suggest that p not be added to the CG.10
2.5 Repp: FALSUM
The foregoing challenges carry over to the FALSUM-based context-management
account of NPQs developed by Repp [49–51] (also Romero [56]). Since Repp’s focus
isn’t on speaker expectation biases, I present the view only briefly.
R&H treat the preposing of negation as introducing an additional operator,
VERUM, which interacts with negation. In Repp’s account, preposed negation is itself
a context-managing operator: FALSUM.
(43) FALSUMigx/i
= λpst .λws . ∀w′ ∈ Epix(w) : ∀w′′ ∈ Convx(w′) : p /∈ CGw′′
= FOR-SURE-NOT-CGx
(44) a. Isn’t Jane coming (too)?
b. LF: [Q [FALSUM [Jane is coming (too)]]]
c. (44b)(wo) = {FOR-SURE-NOT-CGx j,¬FOR-SURE-NOT-CGx j}
Roughly put, FALSUM p expresses certainty that p shouldn’t be added to the CG. In
using an NPQ ∼p?,
the speaker conveys a previous epistemic bias towards p and wishes to double-
check that p is part of the CG. This is done by using FALSUM. . . [T]he
addressee is expected to determine whether or not there are zero degrees of
strength for adding p to CG. (Repp [51, 243, 240])
the speaker wonders . . . whether the addressee has fully convincing evidence
for not adding p to the CG, suggesting that the speaker is biased towards p and
would need strong evidence to be convinced that p should not be added to CG.
(Romero [56, 508])
10The worry is vivid for epistemic possibility expressions whose context-managing use is invariable,
analogous to epistemic really, e.g. perhaps (Ernst [13, 515n.14]). For other expressions of epistemic pos-
sibility, all parties agree that many can have intuitively expressive/context-oriented uses with discourse
and embedding properties like those attributed to really (e.g. von Fintel [15], Papafragou [43], Ernst [13]).
On such uses, the “intents” of the NPQ and EPQ are predicted to be equivalent.
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Repp doesn’t say why using a question with the denotation in (44) amounts to
“double-checking p,” or why double-checking p conveys a “previous epistemic bias
towards p.” Perhaps Repp might follow R&H’s appeal to intent. However, observe
that the pronounced cell in (44) (FOR-SURE-NOT-CG j ) is stronger than the pro-
nounced cell in R&H’s denotation in (15) (¬FOR-SURE-CG j ). The predicted intent
of ∼p? would be to pursue conclusive evidence against p. It’s unclear why requesting
conclusive evidence against p (or against adding p to the CG) would necessarily con-
vey an expectation that p (cf. (ii) in (35)). One might expect ¬p but wish to ensure
that the possibility that p isn’t hastily dismissed, as in (45).
(45) [Context: A dialogue between Moore (M) and a reluctant anti-skeptic (R)]
M: Of course you have hands!
R: Am I obviously/really/surely not a brain-in-a-vat? It’s hard to deny that I
have hands, but do we have conclusive reasons for rejecting the skeptic’s
arguments? Can we rule out the possibility that my apparent experiences
as if I have hands are the results of neuroscientists stimulating my brain?
It’s felicitous for the reluctant anti-skeptic to request conclusive evidence against the
hypothesis BIV that she is a handless brain-in-a-vat even though she is epistemically
biased against the hypothesis and expects ¬BIV .11
2.6 Recap
Let’s recap. Using an NPQ ∼p? invariably conveys that one previously expected the
positive answer p to be correct. Context-management accounts attempt to capture this
“speaker expectation bias” by treating NPQs fundamentally as questions about the
proper discourse status of a proposition; NPQs are interpreted with respect to an oper-
ator that directly targets a parameter in the representation of the discourse context.
This section has raised challenges to provide more adequate accounts of the posited
operator’s context-managing content and its implementation in the compositional
semantics and discourse dynamics — accounts that capture relevant linguistic and
discourse differences with other broadly epistemic, expressive, and context-oriented
devices.
In R&H’s account of speaker expectation biases with NPQs, the existence of a
bias is derived from the speaker’s use of a question with an “epistemically unbal-
anced” partition denotation; the bias’s positive polarity is derived from the nature of
the type of act performed in pronouncing the cell ¬FOR-SURE-CGx p in the parti-
tion. We have seen reasons to question both moves: Contrary to claim (iii) in (35),
11Really not questions are especially puzzling for FALSUM-based analyses of NPQs. The predicted intents
of Really ¬p? and ∼p? are nearly equivalent, as reflected in (i) in comparison to (44) (i.e., pursuing
certainty about adding ¬p to CG vs. pursuing certainty about not adding p to CG, the latter in principle
allowing for settled agnosticism). Yet the really not question needn’t convey a prior expectation in the
positive answer. (We will return to this in Section 3.4.)
(i) a. Is Jane really/obviously/surely not coming? (= Q [VERUM ¬j ])
b. {FOR-SURE-CGx ¬j,¬FOR-SURE-CGx ¬j}
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using a question with an epistemically unbalanced partition can be felicitous even if
one is neutral about the embedded proposition (cf. (36)–(37)); contrary to claim (ii),
requesting grounds for doubting a proposition p can be compatible with one’s conver-
sational goals even if one expects ¬p (cf. (38)). Performing an act of the type claimed
to be conventionally performed in using an NPQ can be appropriate while lacking a
positive expectation that p — e.g., while being neutral about p, being biased toward
¬p, or having higher credence in p yet wishing to leave open the possibility that
¬p (also (39)). The data with epistemic possibility questions present a general chal-
lenge for broadly epistemic accounts: The NPQ ∼p? and EPQ ♦¬p? present roughly
the same possibilities for how the discourse might evolve, and highlight roughly the
same possible continuation of the discourse; yet they express contrasting attitudes
and have contrasting discourse functions (cf. (41)–(42)).
3 Deriving Context-Management and Expectation Biases with NPQs
A key insight in R&H’s discussion is that “really or VERUM is used not to assert that
the speaker is entirely certain about the truth of p, but to assert that the speaker is cer-
tain that p should be added to the Common Ground” [57, 627]. This section argues
that we can capture the roles of NPQs in expressing speaker attitudes and managing
the discourse common ground without giving an element such as VERUM the seman-
tics of an epistemic modal about the context itself. To fix ideas I follow R&H in
assuming that preposing negation introduces an additional operator, VERUM.12 How-
ever, I suggest that we treat VERUM as having an ordinary semantics of epistemic
necessity, though conventionally associated with a general kind of speaker-endorsing,
discourse-oriented use of context-sensitive language. The proposed epistemic ope-
rator account elucidates the role of VERUM in coordinating speakers’ epistemic atti-
tudes, captures relevant similarities and differences among VERUM and categories
of epistemic vocabulary, and provides more rigorous derivations of speaker expecta-
tion biases with NPQs — their existence, specific polarity, and strength. Section 3.1
provides background on the assumed semantics for modals and notion of discourse-
oriented use. Section 3.2 shows how we can capture the context-managing role of
VERUM utilizing the general semantic and pragmatic resources from Section 3.1.
Drawing on independently motivated apparatus from literatures on modals and a gen-
eral principle of discourse relevance (Section 3.3), I show how we can capture the
discourse differences between NPQs and epistemic modal questions and derive the
distinctive speaker expectation biases of NPQs (Section 3.4).
3.1 Endorsing and Discourse-Oriented Use
It’s common to distinguish endorsing uses of modal expressions, in which the speaker
is presented as endorsing the considerations with respect to which the modal is
12An alternative Repp-style account, which treats preposed negation as having an epistemic semantics, is
briefly considered in Section 4.2.
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interpreted, and non-endorsing uses, in which the speaker isn’t presented in this
way (cf. Lyons [35, 36]).13 The non-endorsing deontic use in (46) reports what Ed’s
parents’ rules require. The non-endorsing epistemic use in (47) describes what is
possible/necessary according to the information provided in the filing cabinet. The
verifying norms/information in (46)–(47) needn’t be accepted by the speaker.
(46) Ed has to be home by 10. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I were him.
a. ≈ According to Ed’s parents’ rules, Ed has to be home by 10.
(47) [Context: We’re standing before a locked filing cabinet. None of us has had
access to the information in it, but we know it contains the police’s complete
evidence about the murder of Klotho Fischer and narrows down the set of
suspects. We’re betting on who might have killed Fischer according to the
information in the filing cabinet. You, who we all know is innocent, say:]
I might/must have done it. (adapting Kratzer [30, 98–99])
By contrast, in (48)–(49) A’s utterances express her acceptance of norms implying
that Sally contribute to prison reform, and her acceptance of information compatible
with the butler’s being the killer, respectively. A prototypical function of such uses is
to coordinate on what information, norms, etc. to accept in the discourse, as reflected
in B’s replies.
(48) A: Sally must contribute to prison reform. She has the resources, and they
need our support.
B: Yeah, you’re right.
B ′: No, it’s fine the way it is.
(49) A: The butler might be the killer.
B: Yeah, we can’t rule him out. We still need to see if his alibi checks out.
B ′: No, it can’t be him. It must have been the gardener; I saw him lurking
around before the crime.
Given the prominence of appeals to special discourse-oriented operators in accounts
such as R&H’s, it is worth spelling out how the expressive/context-managing proper-
ties of endorsing uses in assertions and questions may be captured without assuming
such operators. To illustrate how the account may be developed with minimal
revisionary apparatus, I assume a classical contextualist semantics which imple-
ments the context-sensitivity of the relevant epistemic expressions in same kind of
way as the context-sensitivity of individual pronouns, quantifiers, etc.; I assume
in particular the sort of contextualist approach developed in Silk [65, 66]. Read-
13This distinction has been noted in many areas under various labels; see also Hare [24], von Wright
[91], Narrog [42], Verstraete [89], Silk [65, 66]. Expressions may differ in tendencies for endorsing/non-
endorsing use; e.g., for deontic readings of modal verbs, ‘must’ is typically used endorsingly, whereas
‘have to’ is more flexible (e.g. Ernst [13], Van Linden [87], Silk [65, 69]). I use ‘endorsement’ as a cover
term for acceptance attitudes of various kinds; one can “endorse” (accept) information, norms, goals, etc.
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ers favoring relativist/expressivist semantics may adapt the discussion accordingly
(see n. 9).
Following common practice I treat modal operators as semantically associated
with a variable determining a set of premises (propositions) (Kratzer [27, 28]).14
Since modals can occur in intensional contexts, premise sets are indexed to a world
of evaluation. What context supplies for interpretation is a premise frame: a func-
tion P from worlds w to premise sets P(w). Epistemic readings call for a premise
frame that encodes a body of information. Using Sal might P7 have killed Fischer in
the context in (47) assumes that context determines an assignment gc that maps the
(typed) premise-frame pronoun P7 to a premise frame P encoding the salient infor-
mation provided in the filing cabinet, and asserts that gc(7)(w) is compatible with
the proposition k that Sal killed Fischer.
(50) Sal might P7 have killed Fischerc,gc (w0) = 1 iff ⋂ (gc(7)(w0) ∪ {k}) 
= ∅
Endorsing uses of epistemic modals (hereafter endorsing-epistemic uses) call
for an epistemic premise frame variable that represents information endorsed in
the context (Silk [65, 66]). For expository purposes I use ‘Pe’ for the variable
invoked in endorsing-epistemic uses, with the subscript ‘e’ to indicate the intended
index/assignment and interpretation of the variable. In the unembedded case Pe typi-
cally corresponds to the discourse common ground, the information taken for granted
in the conversation. This reflects the paradigmatic role of epistemic modals in com-
munal inquiry. Generally put, an endorsing-epistemic use of Must/Might p assumes
a value for Pe, Pe, and is true at w iff p follows from/is compatible with Pe(w).
This framework provides an attractive way of characterizing the roles of epistemic
language in expressing speakers’ states of mind and managing the discourse com-
mon ground.15 First, note that there is no reference to the discourse context or “the
relevant information,” considered de dicto, in the content of an epistemically modal-
ized sentence. Common characterizations of contextualism notwithstanding (e.g. Silk
[61, 212–213], MacFarlane [37, 146–147]), on the present semantics epistemic modal
sentences aren’t fundamentally about an individual, group, or discourse context;
they make claims about the logical properties of a given epistemic premise frame.
Endorsing-epistemic uses don’t simply say what is possible, necessary, etc. according
to some body of information; they assume that the information is to be accepted in
14I assume that premise set parameters are syntactically realized as pronouns (cf. von Fintel and Heim
[17]). The premise-semantic implementation assumed here is equivalent (Lewis [34]) to the implementa-
tion in Kratzer [28, 29] which uses a set of propositions to preorder the set of accessible worlds. Kratzer’s
[28, 29] semantics uses two premise sets: a “modal base” F(w) that describes some set of background
facts in w, and an “ordering source” G(w) that represents the content of some ideal in w. This complica-
tion won’t be relevant here; I treat modals as evaluated with respect to a single finite, consistent premise
set. I sometimes suppress world-indexing on premise sets; talk about p “following from (/being compati-
ble with) P ” is short for saying that p follows from (/is compatible with) P(w), for any relevant world w.
I address further details of the formal semantics shortly (see also Silk [65, 66]). I use bold for variables,
and italics for their values in context.
15The following discussion draws on material in Silk [65, ch. 3].
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the discourse.16 This feature will be important when comparing the proposed account
of VERUM and NPQs with the context-managing operator accounts from Section 2.
Second, it’s well-known that in discourse we keep track of information not only
about the subject matter of the discourse but also about the discourse situation itself.
The worlds in the context set CS fix facts about the interlocutors, the extra-linguistic
context, and the semantic values of expressions (cf. Stalnaker [73, 76]). So, one effect
of accepting an endorsing-epistemic use of e.g. Must p is that the CS is updated
to include only worlds in which (among other things) the concrete discourse situa-
tion determines an abstract representation of context g that maps Pe to an epistemic
premise frame that implies p, i.e. a set of worlds in which the interlocutors endorse
information that implies p. Compare how S’s utterance in (51) may update atten-
tion to a certain baby b, conveying S’s assumptions about what individual is to be
treated as maximally salient; and how accepting S’s utterance updates the CS to a set
of worlds in which the concrete discourse determines an abstract representation of
context g mapping i to b, b is salient, and b is laughing.
(51) a. S: Look, hei’s laughing.
b. hei is laughingc,gc (w0) = 1 iff gc(i) is laughing in w0
Uses of context-sensitive expressions thus reflect speakers’ assumptions about the
relevant content-determining features of context. Although the compositional seman-
tics takes as given a particular abstract assignment which supplies values for (e.g.)
pronouns, what contextual resolution is determined can become at-issue, or have
main-point status, in concrete utterances (cf. Thomason et al. [82], Simons [70], Silk
[65]). Consider (52) from Silk [62].
(52) [Context: It’s America before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.
Chip is a well-known sexist.]
Chip: Ain’t America great? Everyone can vote.
Dorothy: No, not everyone can vote. I still can’t. [65, 20–21]
Roughly, Chip’s utterance says that every relevant individual in America can
vote — slightly less roughly, that every individual in America with a moral right to
vote is legally permitted to vote. Insofar as Chip intends to say something true, it’s
mutually obvious that he is assuming that women aren’t to be considered in ques-
tions about voting rights. To avoid encouraging further discrimination in the future,
Dorothy acts in a way which assumes that Chip’s assumption is false; her utterance
assumes that women aren’t to be excluded from the conversationally relevant domain
of individuals. Chip’s and Dorothy’s contrasting contextual assumptions can lead to
negotiation about which individuals have a moral right to vote and why.
16In a relativist or expressivist implementation, the resolution of the pronoun in endorsing uses would be
abstracted over in the truth-conditional content (broadly construed) or directly targeted in the semantic
update, as in e.g. (i), where P∗gc,P ∗ = P ∗ is an informational parameter added in the index of evaluation
(see n. 9).
(i) might P∗gc,P ∗(p)(w0) = 1 iff ⋂(P ∗(w0) ∪ {p}) 
= ∅
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Epistemic modal sentences semantically express propositions about logical rela-
tions between propositions and premise sets. Such logical matters aren’t typically
what is at-issue in conversation. What is typically interesting in a speaker’s epistemic
modal utterance is a certain assumption of its use: that the endorsed information, and
hence value for Pe, is such as to make one’s utterance true. It is this assumed value for
Pe that delineates the live possibilities in the conversation. Epistemic modals afford
an efficient means of managing interlocutors’ assumptions about what information
to take for granted in the conversation.17
Let’s return to questions. Consider (53). Intuitively, S’s question targets the rele-
vant standard i associated with rich— how rich one must be to count as rich. If A
gives a yes-answer — roughly, that Rita’s income is at least as great as gc(i) — S can
infer that A assumes gc(i) is no greater than $X/yr. Analogous phenomena occur with
epistemic modal questions such as (54) (hereafter endorsing-epistemic questions).
(53) [Context: S knows approximately how much money Rita earns (say, $X/yr),
and S thinks A does too. Hoping to ascertain A’s views on whether such a
salary counts as rich, S asks:]
Is Rita richi?
(54) [Context: S isn’t sure who the killer is, and wants to see if A has a better
idea. S asks:]
Might the gardener have done it?
Intuitively, S’s question targets the relevant information associated with the modal.
It’s not that S is inquiring about the logical implications of such-and-such mutually
accepted body of evidence. S wants to ascertain if A has evidence that rules out the
possibility d that the gardener is the killer. If A gives a no-answer — roughly, that
Pe is incompatible with d — S can infer that A isn’t treating d as a live possibility.
Call uses such as those in (48)–(49), (52)–(54) — uses which distinguish among
worlds in the CS based on features determining the representation of context
gc in those worlds, and propose to adjust live values for a contextual parame-
ter — discourse-oriented uses. It’s controversial how to model the discourse dynam-
ics of discourse-oriented uses (in my terminology) in assertions and questions (for
relevant discussion see Barker [4], Murray [41], Silk [63, 65, 68]; also n. 9). What
is important here is simply that uses of endorsing-epistemic questions in conversa-
tion can have an effect of partitioning the worlds in the CS based on whether the
concrete discourse situation in those worlds determines a value for Pe that bears the
stated logical relation to the proposition embedded under the modal.18 One effect of
17The relevant attitude toward the proposition that the context, hence contextually determined assignment,
is thus-and-so isn’t belief but acceptance for purposes of the conversation (Stalnaker [72], Thomason [81]).
In endorsing-epistemic uses one needn’t believe that the assumed information is commonly accepted prior
to one’s utterance (cf. Stalnaker [74]). See Silk [65] for extensive discussion of this feature of epistemic
modals and differences among context-sensitive expressions in tendencies for (non-)discourse-oriented use.
18More precisely: ... an effect of partitioning the worlds w in the CS based on whether the concrete dis-
course determines an abstract representation of context gcw which supplies such a value. My talk about
concrete discourses determining values for variables can be understood as short for the latter formulation
in terms of contextually determined assignments.
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accepting a no-answer to (54) is that the CS is updated to a set of worlds in which
the interlocutors endorse information that excludes the proposition d — formally, in
which the concrete discourse determines a value for Pe that is incompatible with d.
This is parallel to how one effect of S’s utterance in (53) is that the worlds in the
CS are partitioned based on whether the concrete discourse situation in those worlds
determines a standard for rich, rc, such that Rita’s income is at least rc; and one effect
of a yes-answer is that the CS is updated to a set of worlds in which this is the case.
This section has examined how phenomena of context-management can arise
with context-sensitive language generally. The following sections examine how the
general resources from this section may be applied to VERUM and NPQs.
3.2 VERUM as a Conventionally Endorsing Epistemic Operator: Attitude
Expression and Context Management with VERUM
I suggest that we capture VERUM’s expressive and context-managing roles by treating
it as conventionally endorsing, in the sense of Section 3.1. A preliminary lexical entry
is in (55) (see nn. 1, 14; j is the set of worlds in which Jane is coming to the party).19
(55) VERUMc,gc = λP〈s,〈st,t〉〉.λpst .λws :P is a body of information endorsed in
c .
⋂
P(w) ⊆ p (preliminary)
(56) VERUM Pe Jane is comingc,gc (w0) is defined only if gc(e) is a body of
information endorsed in c. Where defined,
VERUM Pe Jane is comingc,gc (w0) = 1 iff ⋂ gc(e)(w0) ⊆ j
This semantics predicts straightway VERUM’s roles in managing the CG and in
expressing speakers’ attitudes, both about the subject matter of the discourse and
about the discourse situation. Using VERUM p conventionally conveys that the veri-
fying information is endorsed in the context and that this information implies p. The
speaker expresses her state of mind about p — her acceptance of p — in the sense
of performing an act that is appropriate only if she is in that state of mind (cf. Bach
and Harnish [3]). Given what the common ground CG represents — a body of infor-
mation accepted for purposes of conversation — using VERUM p thus expresses the
speaker’s intention to update the CG to a value that implies p. This value can be man-
aged in subsequent discourse via the general mechanisms of discourse-oriented use
described in Section 3.1.
The present account avoids the worries with conflating VERUM with epistemic atti-
tude predicates (Section 2.2). Suppose with R&H that epistemic really has the same
semantics as VERUM. Using really assumes an epistemic premise frame which rep-
resents a body of contextually endorsed information. In uttering Really p the speaker
expresses her attitudes about p and the proper discourse status of p; she doesn’t
19I continue to use e/e to indicate the intended reading (index, assignment), and use variables p, q, etc.
both for 〈s, t〉 functions and their characteristic sets (sets of worlds). I will often suppress reference to the
assignment, and omit the definedness condition that Pe be a body of contextually endorsed information.
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report them.20 So, in (57), while there may be something odd in reporting that one is
certain about one’s own fatigue (as if it was something one might be mistaken about),
there is nothing odd in intending to ensure that one’s fatigue be explicitly registered
in the body of contextually endorsed information.
(57) a. ?I am sure I am tired.
b. I really am tired.
Really p isn’t semantically or conversationally equivalent to I know p, I’m sure that
p, I’m certain that we should accept p, etc.
Giving VERUM a semantics of epistemic necessity doesn’t require identifying it as
an epistemic modal verb/adverb. There are linguistic differences among VERUM and
categories of epistemic modal expressions. For instance, uses of epistemic Must p
generally imply that p is the conclusion of an inference (Karttunen [26], von Fintel
and Gillies [16]); no such implication is observed with VERUM:
(58) [Context: I directly introspect that I’m tired.]
a. I really am tired.
b. #I must be tired.
(59) [Context: A and B are talking on the phone.]
A: At least it isn’t raining by you.
B: No, it really is raining. I’m looking out the window.
B ′: #No, it must be raining. I’m looking out the window.
Whereas epistemic must generally scopes over negation, VERUM patterns with cer-
tain epistemic adverbs in being able to scope under negation (e.g. Ernst’s [13] weak
PPIs (probably) and non-PPI evidentials (obviously)). In languages such as English,
context must supply a type of reading for modal verbs to have a specific interpre-
tation; even fixing a particular type of reading (e.g. epistemic), non-endorsing uses
are generally possible. VERUM, in contrast, is lexically specific both for modal flavor
(epistemic) and endorsing use.21
20The importance of the express/report distinction has a rich history in metaethics (e.g. Stevenson [78],
Gibbard [19]); see also nn. 9, 13.
21A qualification: In Section 1 we observed that NPQs can sometimes convey a normative expectation, e.g.:
(i) a. Aren’t you ashamed of yourselves?
b. Are you really not ashamed of yourselves?
One approach would be to treat VERUM as lexically flavor-neutral, as reflected in (ii), though perhaps recei-
ving epistemic readings by default. On this line, using VERUM in (i) would directly express an intention to
update the norms accepted for purposes of conversation (Portner [45], Silk [65, 67]) to a value that implies p.
(ii) VERUMc,gc = λP〈s,〈st,t〉〉.λpst .λws :P is a body of considerations (information, norms)
endorsed in c .
⋂
P(w) ⊆ p
An alternative is to treat VERUM as uniformly epistemic and derive the normative character of the expec-
tation in (e.g.) (i) as an implicature. It isn’t implausible that performing an act expressing that one
presupposes p when the truth of p is under the control of the addressee may, in suitable contexts, convey
a normative expectation that the addressee see to it that p (cf. Bybee et al. [11], Silk [69]). For present
purposes I assume the latter option and treat VERUM as lexically specific for modal flavor (epistemic), as
well as strength (necessity) and endorsing use.
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To recap: I have suggested that we give VERUM the semantics of an epistemic
necessity operator lexically specified for endorsing use. VERUM is conventionally
interpreted with respect to a premise frame representing a body of contextually
endorsed information. We can capture the intuition that uses of VERUM convention-
ally express speakers’ attitudes about the common ground and how it should evolve,
without encoding a metacontextual element in the conventional content. Context-
management with VERUM is explained in terms of general mechanisms associated
with discourse-oriented uses of context-sensitive language. The account avoids the
technical problems with R&H’s formalization, and provides independently motivated
resources for capturing VERUM’s expressive and context-managing roles.
3.3 Structured Information States and Discourse Relevance
Let’s return to NPQs and speaker expectation biases. Following R&H I assume
that the preposing of negation introduces VERUM. In Section 2 we saw that R&H’s
account starts by deriving the existence of a bias from an economy principle (17).
Analyzing VERUM as a conventionally endorsing epistemic operator might seem to
help capture the existence of a bias without requiring a non-violable pragmatic prin-
ciple specific to “meta-conversational” moves and “unbalanced” partitions: Ordinary
assertions and questions are conventional devices for managing the CG and structur-
ing inquiry; so, using an additional device like VERUM will be generally infelicitous
unless one has special reasons to do so — say, unless the speaker has some views
about p and its proper discourse status, and strong enough views to warrant invoking
a conventional endorsing device. Yet such an implicature falls quite short of a full-
blown epistemic bias. As we saw in Section 2.4, one may have doubts about adding
p to the CG, and use VERUM, while having equal credence in p and ¬p. This section
develops an account of speaker expectation biases which doesn’t require giving econ-
omy a central explanatory role. The account captures the existence of a bias as well
as its specific content, polarity, and strength.
A preliminary denotation for an NPQ Isn’t Jane coming too? is in (60) (nn. 1,
19).22 As per our discussion of the discourse dynamics from Section 3.1, uttering
(60) has an effect of (among other things) partitioning the worlds in the CS based
on whether the concrete discourse situation in those worlds determines a value for
Pe that implies j (n. 18); and one effect of accepting (say) a yes-answer is that the
CS is updated to a set of worlds in which the interlocutors endorse information that
implies j .
(60) Isn’t Jane coming to the party (too)? (NPQ ∼j?)
a. LF: [Q not [VERUM Pe [Jane is coming (too)]]]
b. (60a)c,gc (w0) = {λw. ⋂Pe(w) ⊆ j, λw. ⋂Pe(w)  j}
22I will often leave Pe unspecified in question denotations because of the issues in Section 3.1
concerning local readings under the question operator.
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Treating VERUM as an epistemic necessity operator makes vivid the challenge for
context-management accounts from Section 2.4 of distinguishing NPQs from associ-
ated epistemic modal questions. Compare the “intent” — denotation and pronounced
cell — in (63) for NPQs ∼p? with the intent in (64) for endorsing uses of epis-
temic possibility questions (EPQs) such as (61) (nn. 1, 19). (Unless otherwise noted,
assume that all uses of epistemic possibility expressions are endorsing uses, abbrevi-
ated ♦e, i.e. uses interpreted with respect to a premise frame variable representing a
body of contextually endorsed information.)
(61) a. Is Jane perhaps/maybe/possibly not coming?
b. Might Jane not be coming? (EPQ ♦e¬j?)
(62) ♦epc,gc (w0) = 1 iff ⋂(Pe(w0) ∪ {p}) 
= ∅
(63) NPQ ∼p? Intent
{λw. ⋂Pe(w) ⊆ p, λw. ⋂Pe(w)  p}
(64) EPQ ♦e¬p? Intent
{λw. ⋂(Pe(w) ∪ {¬p}) 
= ∅, λw. ⋂(Pe(w) ∪ {¬p}) = ∅}
The pronounced cell of ∼p? is the set of worlds w such that Pe(w) doesn’t imply
p; the pronounced cell of ♦e¬p? is the set of worlds w such that Pe(w) is
compatible with ¬p. Given that Pe(w) is a set of propositions, the pronounced
cells are logically equivalent. But if an NPQ ∼p? and an EPQ ♦¬p? have the
same intent — “pursuing the topic ‘lack of complete certainty about p’ or ‘pos-
sible . . . doubts about p’ ” (Romero and Han [57, 646]) — whence their discourse
differences? Why does the NPQ, unlike the EPQ, invariably convey a prior expec-
tation that p? Why can the EPQ, unlike the NPQ, be used to raise the possibility
that ¬p? Even bracketing the differences in polarity of the observed epistemic impli-
catures, why does an NPQ invariably express an antecedent bias about p, while an
EPQ need only express some credence? These questions are pressing for any broadly
epistemic approach to NPQs.
Our aim is to distinguish the negated necessity answer ¬ in an NPQ from the
possibility answer ♦¬ in an EPQ. We need a semantics which distinguishes a state of
not accepting the epistemic necessity of p from a state of committing to the epistemic
possibility of ¬p. Such a distinction is independently motivated by work on attention
and attitude ascriptions with epistemic modals (Franke and de Jager [18], Rothschild
[59], Yalcin [93], Willer [90]). In (65) you might fail to accept that it must be raining
in Abuja because you have alternative views about the weather there; but you also
might fail to accept it because you have never considered the question. Even if asked,
you might have no idea what to say. In the discourse in (66), the possibility of John’s
being home changes from being merely compatible with what is taken for granted to
being a relevant live possibility.
(65) S: Might it be raining in Abuja? Do you think it’s possible?
A: Abuja? Where’s that? I have no idea. I don’t know whether it might be
raining there.
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(66) A: I can’t find John. Do you know where he is?
B: He might be at home.
A: Oh, OK, I’ll call him and check. (Willer [90, ex. 6])
Treating p as a live possibility is more committal than merely failing to accept ¬p.
One way of capturing these distinctions is to enrich the structure of bodies
of information and attitude states. Following moves in formal epistemology and
epistemic modals literatures, I represent informational states with a set of sets of
propositions (cf. Beaver [5], Rothschild [59], Yalcin [93], Willer [90], Moss [40];
see Silk [64, §4.2] on deontic modals). A revised semantics for epistemic possibil-
ity/necessity operators ♦/ is as follows, where P = P is a set of premise frames
representing a body of information. Denotations with epistemic modal verbs are
in (69) (i now a typed index for type 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, t〉).
(67) ♦c,gc (P)(p)(w) = 1 iff ∀P ∈ P : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {p}) 
= ∅
(68) c,gc (P)(p)(w) = 1 iff ∀P ∈ P : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p
(69) It might Pi be rainingc,gc(w0)=1 iff ∀P ∈gc(i) : ⋂(P (w0)∪{rain}) 
= ∅
This says that p is epistemically necessary/possible iff p follows from/is compatible
with every epistemic premise set in the given set P . A possibility p can be merely
compatible with a body of information P , and ¬p can fail to be accepted as epistem-
ically necessary, without it being the case that p is delineated as a live possibility:
¬¬p is true iff some epistemic premise frame in P is compatible with p, but the
truth of ♦p requires that every epistemic premise frame in P be compatible with p.
Interlocutors can fail to presuppose ¬p without thereby committing to the possibility
that p.23
Extending the general semantics for epistemic operators in (67)–(68) to VERUM
and endorsing uses of epistemic modals yields distinct denotations and pronounced
cells (intents) for an NPQ ∼p? and EPQ ♦e¬p?, as reflected in (70)–(73), where Pe is
the variable for a set of epistemic premise frames representing a body of contextually
endorsed information (nn. 1, 19). As in our preliminary semantics, VERUM is distin-
guished from universal modal expressions such as ‘have to’ in lexically specifying
modal flavor (epistemic) and endorsing use (n. 21).
(70) VERUMc,gc = λP〈〈s,〈st,t〉〉,t〉.λpst .λws :P is a body of information
endorsed in c. ∀P ∈ P : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p
(71) a. VERUM Pe pc,gc (w0) is defined only if gc(e) is a body of information
endorsed in c. Where defined,
VERUM Pe pc,gc (w0) = 1 iff ∀P ∈ gc(e) : ⋂P(w0) ⊆ p
b. ♦e¬pc,gc (w0) = 1 iff ∀P ∈ gc(e) : ⋂(P (w0) ∪ {¬p}) 
= ∅
(72) NPQ ∼p? Intent
{λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p, λw.¬∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p}
23I treat possibilities as propositions. In saying that one “accepts the possibility of p” or “treats a
possibility p as live,” I mean that one’s information state P verifies ♦p.
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(73) EPQ ♦e¬p? Intent
{λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {¬p}) 
= ∅,
λw.¬∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w)∪ {¬p}) 
= ∅}
The pronounced cell in the EPQ asymmetrically implies the pronounced cell in the
NPQ: the latter is that ¬p isn’t incompatible with the relevant information; the former
is that ¬p is a live possibility.24
How might the contrasting intents in (72)–(73) help explain the discourse differ-
ences between NPQs and associated EPQs? To address this issue I offer the relevance
condition in (74), adapted from Roberts [52] and Simons et al. [71], where the Ques-
tion Under Discussion (QUD) is a set of alternative propositions representing the
current discourse topic.
(74) An utterance is felicitous only if it is relevant to the Question Under
Discussion (QUD), where
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff accepting it contextually implies
an epistemic commitment toward a partial/complete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer such that accept-
ing that answer contextually implies an epistemic commitment toward
a partial/complete answer to the QUD.
Roberts and Simons et al. define relevance in terms of (contextual) implication
between a discourse move’s truth-conditional content and the QUD. The require-
ment in (74) differs in two respects. First, I characterize relevance at the level of
acceptance. This captures the relevance of discourse-oriented uses (Section 3.1) —
discourse moves adjusting the value of a contextual parameter. Suppose the QUD is
who is coming to the party, and S utters Jane really is coming. The truth-conditional
content of the sentence Jane really is coming is that a certain body of informa-
tion implies that Jane is coming. This logical proposition needn’t imply that Jane is
coming. Yet S’s utterance is relevant insofar as accepting it would require (a) accom-
modating a value for Pe that implies that Jane is coming and (b) adjusting the CG
accordingly given what Pe represents, namely a body of contextually endorsed infor-
mation. What is important for relevance is that the discourse move would land one in
a context that accepts an answer to the QUD.
Second, I characterize relevance in terms of implying an epistemic commitment.
The intuitive idea motivating the account of relevance is that discourse moves are
relevant by being “part of a strategy” to resolve the QUD (Roberts [52, 16]; empha-
sis added). A discourse move can be part of a strategy to resolve a question not only
by introducing an answer. Suppose that the QUD is who is coming to the party, and
S utters Maybe Jane is coming. Accepting S’s assertion needn’t imply accepting a
partial answer to the QUD, though it might raise the likelihood of accepting such an
answer, e.g. by directing the conversation toward examining possible evidence for j .
24I will say that a body of information P implies p iff every premise frame in P implies p,
i.e. ∀P ∈ P : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p; and that P is compatible with p iff ∃P ∈ P : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {p}) 
= ∅.
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Yet even this arguably isn’t necessary for relevance. Suppose the QUD is whether
there are spiritual beings, and Agnostic utters Maybe God exists, and maybe God
doesn’t exist; we’ll never know. Accepting Agnostic’s assertion needn’t raise the like-
lihood of accepting an answer to the QUD: Agnostic accepts both the non-eliminable
epistemic possibility that God exists and the non-eliminable epistemic possibility
that God doesn’t exist. However, accepting her assertion does commit one to a sta-
ble epistemic attitude toward an answer to the QUD — settled agnosticism toward
the proposition that God exists. S’s and Agnostic’s assertions are part of a strategy to
resolve the QUD, hence relevant.
We can represent a body of information P as implying an epistemic commitment
E about p if every “representative” in P agrees in delivering an E-relevant verdict
about p — e.g., P accepts p insofar as every P ∈ P implies p, P treats p as a live
possibility insofar as every P ∈ P is compatible with p, etc. To a first approximation:
(75) A body of information P implies an epistemic commitment E toward a
proposition p iff there is some E-associated relation R such that for every
P ∈ P , P bears R to p.
The formulation in (75) would need to be revised to handle more refined proba-
bilistic attitudes. The notion of relevance might also be better characterized in terms
of a comparative notion of epistemic commitment. (74) could be revised to require
that accepting the discourse move transitions the context to a state of stabler epis-
temic commitment — e.g., a narrower range of probabilities — toward an answer to
the QUD. Representations of epistemic states via sets of premise sets, probabil-
ity measures, etc. have been investigated extensively in formal epistemology. The
characterizations in (74)–(75) should suffice for our purposes.
Finally, I assume that assertions constitute proposals to update the CG, and that
such proposals must be grounded for the update to go through (Stalnaker [73, 75],
Clark and Schaefer [12], Traum [84], Gunlogson [21], Farkas and Bruce [14]). The
current QUD remains active until grounding (e.g. acceptance) is signaled. I assume
that if one is in a position to ground an assertion, one should.
3.4 Deriving Speaker Expectation Biases with NPQs and EPQs
This section applies the semantics for epistemic operators and the pragmatic prin-
ciple of discourse relevance from Section 3.3 to expectation biases with NPQs ∼q?
and endorsing uses of EPQs ♦eq?. I focus on the contrasting felicity patterns and
attitudes conveyed in R&H’s four types of “contradiction” and “suggestion” scenar-
ios: responding to an implication that p/¬p, and suggesting p/¬p as an answer to a
relevant question.
Let’s start with EPQs. Accepting the pronounced cell of an EPQ ♦e¬p? commits
one to treating ¬p as a live possibility (cf. (77)). The intent of the question isn’t
just to pursue possible doubts about p; it’s to pursue positive reasons for treating ¬p
as live in the discourse. This correctly predicts, first, that ♦e¬p? cannot be used to
contradict a previous discourse move implying ¬p by conveying credence in p, as
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in (41) reproduced in (76) (nn. 19, 22). (For readability I will use only the maybe
versions in what follows.)
(76) A: The butler is surely the killer. (⇒ ¬g)
S: #Was it maybe not the gardener? (#♦e¬g?)
(77) ♦e¬g? Intent
{λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {¬g}) 
= ∅,
λw.¬∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {¬g}) 
= ∅}
The QUD is who the killer is. Updating with the backgrounded cell of S’s EPQ
♦e¬g? wouldn’t be relevant. The interlocutors already fail to mutually accept the
possibility that ¬g. So, S’s question is relevant only insofar as updating with the pro-
nounced cell would be relevant. Updating with the pronounced cell requires treating
¬g as live. Such a commitment would be implied by accepting A’s assertion. So,
S’s question is potentially relevant only insofar as S isn’t implicitly grounding A’s
assertion and resolving the QUD. Since S didn’t ground A’s assertion, S must not
be in a position to do so. So, S’s utterance is potentially felicitous only insofar as S
wishes to raise doubts about A’s implication that ¬g. But asking to pursue evidence
for the possibility that ¬g is ineffective as a means of resolving the QUD in response
to an implication that ¬g: if S has credence in g and wants to investigate this pos-
sibility, S ought to direct the inquiry accordingly (cf. (78)); and if S wants A to
confirm A’s implication that ¬g, S should use a stronger question that invites A to do
so (cf. (79)).
(78) S ′: Was it maybe the gardener instead?
• Pronounced cell: λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {g}) 
= ∅
(79) S ′′: Was it (really) not the gardener?
• Pronounced cell: ¬g (λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ ¬g)
S’s question is thus inappropriate as a means of advancing the discourse. An EPQ
♦e¬p? is generally infelicitous in response to a discourse move implying ¬p, and
cannot be used to contradict an implication that ¬p by conveying credence in p.
Likewise, an EPQ ♦e¬p? cannot be felicitously used to suggest p as an answer to
a relevant question (cf. (42)):
(80) [Context: Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:]
A: I’d like to send this paper out to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer
somebody who has experience with our regulations.
S: #Has Frege maybe not reviewed for us? He’d be a good one.
(#♦e¬f?, to suggest f )
The implicit QUD is which senior reviewers have already reviewed for the journal;
A’s goal is to find such a reviewer. Updating with the backgrounded cell of S’s EPQ
♦e¬f? wouldn’t be relevant. The interlocutors already fail to mutually accept the
possibility that ¬f. Updating with the pronounced cell could be relevant, but not as a
way of suggesting f. Delineating the possibility that ¬f might advance the discourse,
but only insofar as doing so might narrow the list of potential reviewers or suggest
Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions
some other potential reviewer. (Imagine that Frege and Twin-Frege review comple-
ment sets of journals, and we can’t directly access Twin-Frege’s reviewing history.)
So, if S’s question is felicitous, it’s felicitous only insofar as it excludes Frege.
Conversely, we correctly predict that an EPQ ♦e¬p? can be felicitously used in
response to a discourse move implying p (cf. (39)):
(81) Moore: My hands hurt. (⇒ h)
Skeptic: How do we know you have hands? Maybe you don’t have hands
and you’re just a brain in a vat? (♦e¬h?)
Moore’s assertion implies h that he has hands. Instead of grounding Moore’s asser-
tion, Skeptic raises the EPQ ♦e¬h?. This question is directly relevant to the QUD of
whether Moore has hands which hurt: updating with the pronounced cell implies an
epistemic commitment toward the answer ¬h, namely committing to treating ¬h as a
live possibility. Skeptic’s request to examine reasons for leaving open the possibility
that ¬h may even lead to a stable epistemic attitude about whether h (e.g. acceptance
that ¬h or a settled credence in ¬h). Skeptic’s EPQ can thus be part of a strategy for
resolving the QUD, hence relevant.
♦e¬p? can also be felicitously used to suggest ¬p (cf. Romero and Han [57,
ex. 28]):
(82) [Context: Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:]
A: I’d like to send this paper to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer some-
body new.
S: Has Frege maybe not reviewed for us? He’d be a good one.
(♦e¬f?, to suggest f )
S’s question is directly relevant to the QUD of which senior reviewers haven’t
reviewed for the journal: updating with the pronounced cell implies a commitment
to treating the answer ¬f as a live possibility. Pursuing reasons for leaving open the
possibility that ¬f may increase the likelihood of accepting at least a partial answer
to the QUD and satisfying A’s goal of finding a suitable reviewer.
The above account correctly predicts that EPQs ♦e¬p? don’t express a bias
toward p. Insofar as any epistemic attitude is conveyed, it is a credence in the neg-
ative answer ¬p. Moreover, this credence needn’t be a bias toward ¬p. The bias,
if any, is toward the possibility that ¬p — hence why Skeptic’s question ♦e¬h?
need only express some credence in the skeptical scenario where you’re a handless
brain-in-a-vat.
Let’s turn now to the felicity conditions and expectation biases with NPQs in
R&H’s four types of discourse scenarios. Consider the “contradiction scenario”
where the speaker utters ∼j? in response to a discourse move implying ¬j (cf. (8)):
(83) A: Andre just got here, so it looks like we’re all ready to go. (⇒ ¬j )
S: Isn’t Jane coming too? (∼j?)
(84) ∼p? Intent
{λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ j, λw.¬∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ j}
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The speaker’s expectation bias toward the positive answer j can be derived as fol-
lows. A’s assertion contextually implies ¬j . S responds by asking a question with
the “intent” in (84): roughly put, S raises the question whether to accept informa-
tion implying j (more simply: whether to accept j ), and pronounces the answer
corresponding to not accepting j . Updating with the pronounced cell wouldn’t be
relevant. The interlocutors already fail to mutually accept j . (If S were implicitly
grounding A’s assertion, the interlocutors would be in the even stronger state of
accepting ¬j , and the QUD would be resolved.) So, updating with the pronounced
cell wouldn’t advance the discourse. Updating with the backgrounded cell, by con-
trast, would be relevant: it implies an epistemic commitment to the partial answer j ,
namely acceptance. So, S’s question is potentially felicitous only insofar as S wishes
to pursue reasons for accepting j . Requesting to do so would be infelicitous if S was
antecedently biased toward ¬j , in which case S could have grounded A’s assertion
and accepted ¬j . And it would be infelicitous if S merely had some credence in j
and wanted to investigate this possibility or confirm A’s implication that ¬j , in which
case S could have used a question that highlights one of these options directly, as in
(85)–(86).
(85) S ′: Is Jane maybe coming too?
• Pronounced cell: λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {j}) 
= ∅
(86) S ′′: Is Jane not coming?
• Pronounced cell: ¬j
Yet S’s requesting to consider accepting j would be felicitous if S had a prior
expectation that j . So, assuming S is cooperative, S must have an antecedent bias
toward j .
Next, consider the “suggestion scenario” where the speaker utters ∼f? to suggest
f as an answer to a relevant question (cf. (42)).
(87) [Context: Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:]
A: I’d like to send this paper out to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer
somebody who has experience with our regulations.
S: Hasn’t Frege already reviewed for us? He’d be a good one.
(∼f?, to suggest f )
The implicit QUD is who is an experienced senior reviewer for the journal. Updating
with the pronounced cell of S’s NPQ ∼f? wouldn’t be relevant. The interlocutors
already fail to mutually accept f. Updating with the backgrounded cell, by contrast,
would be relevant, as it would involve accepting an answer to the QUD. So, S’s
question is potentially felicitous only insofar as S wishes to consider accepting f.
Requesting to do so would be infelicitous if S was antecedently biased toward ¬f, in
which case S would regard them as decreasing the likelihood of correctly resolving
the QUD and satisfying A’s goal. And it would be infelicitous if S merely had some
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credence in f and wanted to investigate this possibility, in which case S could have
used a question that highlights this option directly:
(88) S ′: Has Frege already reviewed for us?
• Pronounced cell: f
S ′′: Has Frege maybe already reviewed for us?
• Pronounced cell: λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂(P (w) ∪ {f }) 
= ∅
However, S’s requesting to consider accepting f would be felicitous if S had a prior
expectation that f, in which case S could provide evidence for f in case A lacks
such evidence herself. So, assuming S is cooperative, S must have an antecedent bias
toward f, and must be suggesting f as an answer to the QUD.
The crucial feature of NPQs ∼p?, on the present account, is that they background
the answer in virtue of which they are relevant to the discourse, the answer of accept-
ing p (more precisely, the answer of endorsing information that implies p). This
feature elucidates a crucial discourse role for NPQs. Consider the contradiction sce-
nario in (83). In uttering ∼j? S chooses to background the answer — the only answer
that would be relevant in the discourse — which is contrary to A’s assertion, and
which S antecedently expected was correct. Using the NPQ provides a way of invit-
ing A to consider the alternative option of accepting j , yet without highlighting this
alternative or contradicting A directly. Correspondingly, the answer corresponding to
the pronounced cell represents a weak initial way of registering disagreement with
S’s prior expectation; such a counter-response may subsequently be clarified with
reasons supporting A’s stronger implication that ¬j . Likewise, in (87), using the
NPQ affords a relatively circumspect means of suggesting an answer to the ques-
tion at hand. In backgrounding the answer of accepting f — the only answer which
would be relevant in the discourse — S expresses her prior bias toward f and suggests
accepting f, but without explicitly asserting f or directly requesting A to provide
confirming evidence for f, evidence which A appears to lack herself. In using an NPQ
the speaker S can (a) express disagreement and invite the addressee to defend a prior
assertion, though without directly challenging her; and (b) suggest a relevant possi-
bility toward which S is biased, though without directly asserting it. NPQs afford a
means of raising the option of accepting a proposition and conveying an antecedent
bias, though in a relatively modest way.
Finally, let’s turn to scenarios in which ∼p? is infelicitous. An NPQ ∼p? cannot be
used to contradict a prior discourse move implying p by conveying credence in ¬p:
(89) A: Andre isn’t coming to the party, but the rest of our cohort is. (⇒ j )
S: #Isn’t Jane coming too? (# ∼j?)
Updating with the pronounced cell wouldn’t be relevant or advance the discourse.
The interlocutors already fail to mutually accept j . Updating with the backgrounded
cell could be relevant, but only insofar as A’s assertion hasn’t been grounded and
the QUD remains unresolved. So, S’s utterance is anomalous regardless of S’s prior
views about j : if S is biased toward j , she should ground A’s assertion straight-
way; and if S has doubts about j and wishes to challenge A’s assertion, request
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evidence supporting A’s assertion, or raise the possibility that ¬j , she should perform
a relevant discourse move that directs the inquiry accordingly, as in (90).
(90) S ′: No, Jane isn’t coming either.
S ′′: Is Jane (really) coming too?
S ′′′: Is Jane maybe not coming either?
Likewise, an NPQ ∼p? cannot be felicitously used to suggest ¬p as an answer to a
relevant question:
(91) [Context: Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:]
A: I’d like to send this paper to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer some-
body new.
S: #Hasn’t Frege reviewed for us? He’d be a good one.
(# ∼f?, to suggest ¬f )
The implicit QUD is who is a senior reviewer that hasn’t reviewed for the journal.
Updating with the pronounced cell of S’s NPQ wouldn’t be relevant. The interlocu-
tors already fail to mutually accept f. Updating with the backgrounded cell could be
relevant, but only insofar as it excludes Frege from consideration. If S wishes to sug-
gest ¬f, an additional negative element must be added, the possibility that ¬f must
be highlighted, or an ordinary polar question must be used:
(92) S ′: Hasn’t Frege not reviewed for us?
S ′′: Has Frege maybe not reviewed for us?
S ′′′: Has Frege (not) reviewed for us?
There is a sense in which EPQs behave like simple positive polar questions vis-
a`-vis speaker expectation biases: an EPQ ♦eq? raises the possibility that q and may
express a bias toward the pronounced cell, i.e. that q be a live possibility. So, insofar
as reasons for leaving open the possibility of ¬p are reasons against p, an EPQ
♦e¬p? cannot be felicitously used to disagree with an implication that ¬p, or to
suggest p as an answer to a relevant question. The bias (if any) toward the possibility
that ¬p needn’t constitute a bias toward ¬p. The crucial feature of NPQs is that they
are relevant in virtue of their unpronounced cell — the backgrounded answer that
the contextually endorsed information implies p (roughly, that p is accepted in the
discourse). The discourse differences between NPQs and EPQs — their contrasting
biases and patterns of felicitous use — are derived from these interpretive differences,
further features of context, and general principles of conversation.
In closing, note that the account avoids the problems with really (not) questions
from Sections 2.4–2.5. Pace R&H (e.g. [57, 641, 650–652]), Really p? can convey
merely some credence in ¬p rather than a full-blown bias toward ¬p. Reluctant Anti-
Skeptic in (93) expects the positive answer h that one has hands to be correct,
but still has some credence in the hypothesis that one is a handless brain-in-a-vat;
Settled Agnostic in (94) is unbiased, thinking both answers equally likely (d the
proposition that God exists).
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(93) [Context: Reluctant Anti-Skeptic, in response to Moore’s implication that h:]
Do you really have hands? It’s hard to deny that you do, but can we rule out
the possibility that you’re just a brain-in-a-vat?
(Really h?, to disagree with an implication that h and convey some
credence in ¬h)
(94) [Context: Settled Agnostic, in response to Atheist’s implication that ¬d:]
Does God really not exist? The arguments on both sides strike me as equally
compelling. It seems just as likely that God does exist as that God doesn’t.
(Really ¬d?, to disagree with an implication that ¬d and convey
some credence in d)
Assume with R&H that epistemic really also realizes VERUM. The predicted intent
of the really not question in (94) is as follows:
(95) Really ¬d? Intent
{λw.∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ ¬d, λw.¬∀P ∈ Pe : ⋂P(w) ⊆ ¬d}
The QUD is whether God exists. Agnostic raises the question Really ¬d?, of whether
to accept information that implies ¬d. Updating with the backgrounded cell wouldn’t
be relevant. The interlocutors already fail to mutually accept ¬d. (If Agnostic were
implicitly grounding Atheist’s assertion, and ¬d was accepted, the QUD would
already be resolved.) Updating with the pronounced cell would be relevant: it implies
an epistemic commitment to the answer ¬d, namely acceptance. So, Agnostic’s ques-
tion is felicitous, but only insofar as Agnostic isn’t implicitly grounding Atheist’s
assertion. So, Agnostic must not be in a position to do so; she must have at least
some doubts about ¬d, and some credence in d. The stronger inference that Agnos-
tic is biased toward d needn’t follow. The account avoids conflating NPQs ∼p? with
really not questions, as in Repp’s [51] and Romero’s [56] FALSUM-based accounts
and R&H’s [57] VERUM-based account of “inner-negation” readings (Section 1).
4 Conclusion and Outlook
This paper has examined distinctive discourse properties of preposed negative yes/no
questions (NPQs), focusing on speaker expectation biases. Unlike positive and non-
preposed negative polar questions, using an NPQ ∼p? invariably conveys that the
speaker was biased toward a particular answer, where the polarity of the bias is
opposite of the polarity of the question; using the negative question ∼p? invariably
expresses a prior expectation that the positive answer p is correct. A prominent
approach — what I called the context-management approach, developed most exten-
sively by Romero and Han [57] — attempts to capture NPQs’ expectation biases by
treating NPQs fundamentally as epistemic questions about the proper discourse status
of a proposition. Principal challenges are to provide more adequate formalizations of
the posited context-managing content and its role in generating the observed biases,
and to do so in a way that respects relevant linguistic and discourse differences with
other broadly epistemic, expressive, and context-oriented devices.
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Context-management accounts highlight key features of the interpretation and dis-
course function of NPQs. I have argued that we can capture insights motivating
context-management accounts without positing special context-managing opera-
tors or treating NPQs as questions directly about the context. For concreteness
I followed Romero and Han [57] in treating the preposing of negation as intro-
ducing an additional operator. I suggested that we treat this operator as having
an ordinary semantics of epistemic necessity, though lexically associated with a
general kind of endorsing use observed with modal expressions. NPQs afford con-
ventional devices for expressing speakers’ attitudes and managing the discourse
common ground by being interpreted with respect to an operator conventionally
associated with a body of information endorsed for purposes of conversation. The
distinctive biases and discourse properties of NPQs — including contrasts between
NPQs and associated epistemic modal questions — can be derived from indepen-
dently motivated apparatus from literatures on epistemic modals and theories of
discourse: first, a distinction between possibilities that are merely compatible with
a body of information and possibilities that are explicitly treated as live; second,
a principle of discourse relevance, generalized to capture the relevance of epistem-
ically hedged discourse moves and discourse moves involving discourse-oriented
uses of context-sensitive language. The proposed epistemic operator account cap-
tures the expressive/context-managing roles of NPQs via general features of the
meaning and use of context-sensitive language, and principles of interpretation and
conversation.
In closing I would like to briefly consider several limitations of the present
discussion and possible avenues for development (cf. Section 1).
4.1 NPQs and “Denegations of Assertions”
Context-management accounts distinguish NPQs from other types of polar questions
in terms of distinctive features of an expressive/context-oriented operator. One alter-
native, developed by Krifka [31, 32], is to explain the discourse properties of NPQs
in terms of a distinctive type of speech-act. Using an NPQ ∼p?, on Krifka’s view, is
analyzed as asking the addressee to refrain from asserting p. The analysis is formal-
ized via an additional question operator, REQUEST, which presents only one possible
answer (unlike the ordinary question operator, which presents each possible answer
equally) and a meta-speech-act of denegation, or failing to perform a certain speech-
act (cf. I don’t promise to come, expressing refraining from promising to come).
Krifka asserts that in using an NPQ ∼p?, “the overall intention of the speaker is to ask
for confirmation for the proposition [p]” [31, 31]. No derivation of this intention is
provided. One might wonder why asking the addressee to exclude asserting p would
invariably express a “sole interest” [31, 33] in p or expectation that p. There may be
independent reasons for introducing Krifka’s additional question operators, speech-
acts, and syntactic projections for commitment and speech-act phrases; yet if the
account in this paper is on the right track, such apparatus isn’t necessary to capture
the distinctive discourse properties of NPQs. It would be interesting to examine how
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(endorsing uses of) epistemic modal questions might be analyzed and distinguished
from NPQs in a speech-act framework.25
4.2 Preposed Negation and Epistemic Operators
For dialectical purposes I followed R&H in treating the preposing of negation as
introducing an additional operator, which interacts with negation. It isn’t unprece-
dented to think that certain syntactic configurations/operations can semantically
contribute an attitudinal element (e.g. McCready [39] on man) or epistemic opera-
tor (e.g. Truckenbrodt [86] on V-to-C movement in German; cf. Gutzmann [23]).26
Nevertheless one might wonder why this particular non-canonical syntax (prepos-
ing negation) would systematically trigger adding this particular operator (VERUM),
given the robust crosslinguistic association between preposing negative elements and
the observed discourse-oriented effects.
An alternative analysis, proposed by Repp [49–51] and taken up by Romero [56],
treats preposed negation itself as a context-managing operator (Section 2.5). On the
approach in this paper, preposed negation could be treated as a kind of modal negation
NOTmod (cf. Stone and Hardt [79], Brasoveanu [8], Bittner [6], Anderbois et al. [1]),
as in (96); like VERUM, NOTmod is conventionally specified for endorsing use (‘′’ for
the complement of the characteristic set).
(96) NOTmodc,gc =λP〈〈s,〈st,t〉〉,t〉.λpst .λws :P is a body of information endorsed
in c . ∀P ∈ P : ⋂P(w) ⊆ p′
NPQs, on this line, would be unified with really not questions:
(97) Isn’t Jane coming?
[Q NOTmod [Jane is coming]]
(98) Is Jane really not coming?
[Q VERUM [not [Jane is coming]]]
(99) (97) = (98) ≈ {Pe implies ¬j,¬(Pe implies ¬j)}
In both (97) and (98) the relevant epistemic operator is contributed by a spe-
cific lexical item (cf. Romero and Han [57, 639n.17]). Yet the above question for
the VERUM-based account arises in a new form — why preposed negation should
be associated with a distinct modal lexical entry crosslinguistically. More general
crosslinguistic investigation of links between non-canonical syntax and distinctive
discourse effects is needed. It also remains to be seen how the derivation of speaker
25Similar points apply to the theories in Asher and Reese [2] and Reese [48] which treat NPQs as complex
speech-acts — speech-acts asserting p and then questioning the assertion. The account in this paper doesn’t
require positing a distinct conventionalized complex speech-act type, ASSERTION • QUESTION.
26R&H observe that, even in English, the discourse-oriented properties and “conversational emphasis”
[57, 655] of NPQs arise in declaratives with preposed negative elements as well:
(i) a. Never would Mary reveal the secret.
b. Mary would never reveal the secret. (Romero and Han [57, ex. 122])
A. Silk
expectation biases with NPQs from Section 3.4 would carry over, and how the dif-
ferences between NPQs and really not questions would be explained. The challenges
for Repp’s/Romero’s FALSUM-based account remain pressing (Sections 2.5, 3.4).
4.3 Answer Patterns
There is one final puzzle with NPQs that I would like to consider, regarding answer
patterns (Section 2.3). The most natural interpretation of a bare yes-answer to ∼p? is
as an assertion of p, and the most natural interpretation of a bare no-answer is as an
assertion of ¬p:
(100) Isn’t Jane coming?
a. Yes. (=she is)
b. No. (=she isn’t)
Even if the yes-answer in (100) could be construed as meaning VERUM j , two ques-
tions arise: first, why the yes-answer targets the backgrounded cell; second, why the
no-answer seems to imply ¬j rather than the weaker proposition constituting the
pronounced cell (roughly, that the endorsed information fails to imply j ).
First, observe that hedged answers are possible:
(101) Isn’t Jane coming too?
a. Yeah, I’m not sure / I don’t know. Maybe (not).
b. No, I’m not sure / I don’t know. Maybe (not).
Such answers pose prima facie challenges for existing accounts. The hedged yes-
answer in (101a) is surprising on R&H’s [57] account, which treats yes-answers as
asserting VERUM p. Both (101a–b) are surprising on Romero’s [54–56] account,
which treats yes- and no-answers as necessarily targeting the embedded proposition
p. Repp [51, 241] appeals to hedged yes-answers as evidence for her FALSUM-based
account (targeted cell ≈ “there is some evidence for p”); hedged no-answers remain
unexplained. Krifka [31] treats unqualified answers as assertions of p/¬p by default.
Though Krifka [31, 31] mentions the possibility of hedged yes-answers, no account
is provided. It is unclear how hedged no-answers would be captured.
Suppose we follow Krifka [31] in treating answer particles as referring to a salient
propositional discourse referent (dr) and asserting it or its negation. The VERUM-
based semantics from Section 3 predicts three propositional dr’s with NPQs, yielding
roughly the following possible distinct answers (for simplicity, ignore any differences
between the assertion of φ vs. ψ):
(102) [Q not [VERUM [p]]]
a. dr φ = p
b. dr ψ = VERUM p
c. dr χ = ¬VERUM p
(103) a. No-answer asserting ¬φ
b. Yes-answer asserting φ (≈ ψ = ¬χ )
c. No-answer asserting ¬ψ
d. Yes-answer asserting χ (= ¬ψ)
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This answer pattern for NPQs is essentially the pattern observed in (100)–(101).
The account from Section 3 might seem to be looking pretty good in captur-
ing answer patterns with NPQs: It captures how an unqualified yes-answer can be
interpreted as asserting p and cannot be interpreted as asserting ¬p, and how an
unqualified no-answer can be interpreted as asserting ¬p and cannot be interpreted
as asserting p. It makes sense of why unqualified yes-answers seem to be targeting
the backgrounded cell, as they are in fact targeting the related simple propositional
dr φ. And it predicts the possibility of hedged yes-/no-answers, and their approxi-
mate equivalence. Further, it is perhaps not surprising that simple yes-/no-answers
typically target the embedded proposition, and that hedged answers are relatively
less common. The QUD in uses of VERUM is typically about whether p rather than
about the logical properties of a certain (mutually endorsed) body of evidence. If
the addressee has settled views about p (e.g. in a “contradiction scenario”), she can
answer an NPQ by resolving the QUD. If the addressee is unsure about p (e.g. in
a “suggestion scenario” or a contradiction scenario where the speaker’s question
leads her to rethink her previous implication), she can resort to a hedged answer
that targets one of the cells in the question’s denotation. That said, we should
be cautious in assigning theoretical significance to hedged answers such as those
in (101). Hedged answers are possible with ordinary positive polar questions and
non-preposed negative questions as well.
(104) Is Jane coming?
a. Yeah, I think she is, but I’m not sure.
b. No, I think she isn’t, but I’m not sure.
c. Yeah, I don’t know. Maybe (not).
d. ??No, I don’t know. Maybe.
(105) Is Jane not coming?
a. Yeah, I think she is (/isn’t), but I’m not sure.
b. No, I think she is (/isn’t), but I’m not sure.
c. Yeah, I don’t know. Maybe.
d. No, I don’t know. Maybe.
The matter calls for further investigation.27
Acknowledgements Thanks to an anonymous referee for comments. This research has benefited from the
support of an AHRC Early Career Research Grant (AH/N001877/1) and Leverhulme Research Fellowship
(RF-2018-301\0).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
27See Farkas and Bruce [14] and Roelofsen and Farkas [53] for general discussion of polarity particles
and answer patterns with polar questions.
A. Silk
References
1. AnderBois, S., Brasoveanu, A., Henderson, R. (2015). At-issue proposals and appositive impositions
in discourse. Journal of Semantics, 32, 93–138.
2. Asher, N., & Reese, B. (2007). Intonation and discourse: Biased questions. Interdisciplinary Studies
on Information Structure, 8, 1–38.
3. Bach, K., & Harnish, R. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge: MIT Press.
4. Barker, C. (2002). The dynamics of vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 1–36.
5. Beaver, D. (2001). Presupposition and assertion in dynamic semantics. CSLI Publications: Stanford.
6. Bittner, M. (2011). Time and modality without tenses or modals. In Rathert, M., & Musan, R. (Eds.)
Tense across languages (pp. 147–188). Niemeyer: Tu¨bingen.
7. Bolinger, D. (1978). Yes-no questions are not alternative questions. In Hiz, H. (Ed.) Questions (pp. 87–
105). Dordrecht: Reidel.
8. Brasoveanu, A. (2010). Decomposing modal quantification. Journal of Semantics, 27, 437–527.
9. Brown, J., & Cappelen, H. (Eds.) (2011). Assertion: New philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
10. Bu¨ring, D., & Gunlogson, C. (2000). Aren’t positive and negative polar questions the same? MS,
UCLA & UCSC.
11. Bybee, J., Perkins, R., Pagliuca, W. (1994). The evolution of grammar: Tense, aspect and modality in
the languages of the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
12. Clark, H.H., & Schaefer, E.F. (1989). Contributing to discourse. Cognitive Science, 13, 259–294.
13. Ernst, T. (2009). Speaker-oriented adverbs. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 27, 497–544.
14. Farkas, D.F., & Bruce, K.B. (2010). On reacting to assertions and polar questions. Journal of
Semantics, 27, 81–118.
15. von Fintel, K. (2003). Epistemic modals and conditionals revisited. Slides, UMass Linguistics
Colloquium.
16. von Fintel, K., & Gillies, A.S. (2010). Must . . . stay. . . strong!. Natural Language Semantics, 18,
351–383.
17. von Fintel, K., & Heim, I. (2011). Intensional semantics. MS, MIT.
18. Franke, M., & de Jager, T. (2011). Now that you mention it: awareness dynamics in discourse and
decisions. In Benz, A., Ebert, C., Ja¨ger, G., van Rooij, R. (Eds.) Language, games, and evolution
(pp. 60–91). Berlin: Springer.
19. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices apt feelings: A theory of normative judgment. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
20. Gibbard, A. (2012). Meaning and normativity. New York: Oxford University Press.
21. Gunlogson, C. (2001). True to form: Rising and falling declaratives as questions in English. Ph.D.
thesis, UC Santa Cruz.
22. Gunlogson, C. (2008). A question of commitment. Belgian Journal of Linguistics, 22, 101–136.
23. Gutzmann, D. (2015). Use-conditional meaning: Studies in multidimensional semantics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
24. Hare, R. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Huddleston, R., & Pullum, G.K. (Eds.) (2002). The Cambridge grammar of the English language.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Karttunen, L. (1972). Possible and must. In Kimball, J.P. (Ed.) Syntax and semantics 1 (pp. 1–20).
New York: Academic Press.
27. Kratzer, A. (1977). What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 337–
355.
28. Kratzer, A. (1981). The notional category of modality. In Eikmeyer, H.-J., & Rieser, H. (Eds.) Words,
worlds, and contexts: New approaches in word semantics (pp. 38–74). Berlin: de Gruyter.
29. Kratzer, A. (1991). Modality/Conditionals. In von Stechow, A., & Wunderlich, D. (Eds.) Semantics:
An international handbook of contemporary research (pp. 639–656). New York: de Gruyter.
30. Kratzer, A. (2012). Modals and conditionals: New and revised perspectives. New York: Oxford
University Press.
31. Krifka, M. (2012). Negated polarity questions as denegations of assertions. In Kiefer, F., & Lee,
C. (Eds.) Contrastiveness and scalar implicatures. Berlin: Springer.
32. Krifka, M. (2015). Bias in commitment space semantics: Declarative questions, negated questions, and
question tags. In D’Antonio, S., Moroney, M., Little, C.-R. (Eds.) Proceedings of SALT 25 (pp. 328–
345). Ithaca: CLC Publications.
Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions
33. Ladd, D.R. (1981). A first look at the semantics and pragmatics of negative questions and tag ques-
tions. In Hendrik, R., Masek, C., Miller, M.F. (Eds.) Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistic Society
(CLS) 17 (pp. 164–171). Chicago: CLS.
34. Lewis, D. (1981). Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals. Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, 10, 217–234.
35. Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Lyons, J. (1995). Linguistic semantics: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37. MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
38. Malamud, S.A., & Stephenson, T. (2015). Three ways to avoid commitments: Declarative force
modifiers in the conversational scoreboard. Journal of Semantics, 32, 275–311.
39. McCready, E. (2009). What man does. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, 671–724.
40. Moss, S. (2018). Probabilistic knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
41. Murray, S.E. (2014). Varieties of update. Semantics and Pragmatics, 7, 1–53.
42. Narrog, H. (2005). Modality, mood, and change of modal meanings: A new perspective. Cognitive
Linguistics, 16, 677–731.
43. Papafragou, A. (2006). Epistemic modality and truth conditions. Lingua, 116, 1688–1702.
44. Partee, B.H., & Borschev, V. (2003). Genitives, relational nouns, and argument-modifier ambiguity.
In Lang, E., Maienborn, C., Fabricius-Hansen, C. (Eds.) Modifying adjuncts (pp. 67–112). Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter.
45. Portner, P. (2007). Imperatives and modals. Natural Language Semantics, 15, 351–383.
46. Potts, C. (2005). The logic of conventional implicature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
47. Potts, C. (2007). The expressive dimension. Theoretical Linguistics, 33, 165–197.
48. Reese, B.J. (2007). Bias in questions. Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas at Austin.
49. Repp, S. (2006). ¬(A&B). Gapping, negation and speech act operators. Research on Language and
Computation, 4, 397–423.
50. Repp, S. (2009). Negation in gapping. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
51. Repp, S. (2013). Common ground management: Modal particles, illocutionary negation and VERUM.
In Gutzmann, D., & Ga¨rtner, H.-M. (Eds.) Beyond expressives: Explorations in use-conditional
meaning (pp. 231–274). Leiden: Brill.
52. Roberts, C. (1996). Information structure: Towards an integrated theory of formal pragmatics. In
Yoon, J.-H., & Kathol, A. (Eds.) OSU working papers in linguistics, Vol. 49: Papers in semantics.
Columbus: The Ohio State University.
53. Roelofsen, F., & Farkas, D.F. (2015). Polarity particle responses as a window onto the interpretation
of questions and assertions. Language, 91, 359–414.
54. Romero, M. (2005). Biased yes/no questions, really, and answers. In Proceedings of the workshop on
formal and computational approaches to discourse and other particles. University of Barcelona.
55. Romero, M. (2006). Biased yes/no questions: The role of VERUM. Sprache und Datenverarbeitung,
30, 9–24.
56. Romero, M. (2015). High negation in subjunctive conditionals and polar questions. In Csipak, E., &
Zeijlstra, H. (Eds.) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 19 (pp. 499–516). University of Go¨ttingen.
57. Romero, M., & Han, C.-h. (2004). On negative yes/no questions. Linguistics and Philosophy, 27,
609–658.
58. van Rooy, R., & Sˇafa´rˇova´, M. (2003). On polar questions. In Young, R.B., & Zhou, Y. (Eds.)
Proceedings of SALT 13 (pp. 292–309). Ithaca: CLC Publications.
59. Rothschild, D. (2012). Expressing credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112, 99–114.
60. Sadock, J. (1971). Queclaratives. In Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistic Society (CLS) 7 (pp. 223-
232). Chicago: CLS.
61. Silk, A. (2013). Truth-conditions and the meanings of ethical terms. In Shafer-Landau, R. (Ed.) Oxford
studies in metaethics, Vol. 8 (pp. 195–222). New York: Oxford University Press.
62. Silk, A. (2014). Accommodation and negotiation with context-sensitive expressions. Thought, 3, 115–
123.
63. Silk, A. (2015). Evaluational adjectives. MS, University of Birmingham, https://goo.gl/Ocvuo7.
64. Silk, A. (2015). How to be an ethical expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91,
47–81.
65. Silk, A. (2016). Discourse contextualism: A framework for contextualist semantics and pragmatics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
66. Silk, A. (2017). How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.
Philosophical Studies, 174, 1773–1799.
A. Silk
67. Silk, A. (2017). Normative language in context. In Shafer-Landau, R. (Ed.) Oxford studies in
metaethics, Vol. 12 (pp. 206–243). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
68. Silk, A. (2018). Semantics with assignment variables. MS, University of Birmingham. https://goo.gl/
kFVhw3.
69. Silk, A. (2018). Weak and strong necessity modals: On linguistic means of expressing “a primitive
concept OUGHT”. In Plunkett, D., & Dunaway, B. (Eds.) Meaning, decision and norms: Themes from
the work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor: Michigan Publishing.
70. Simons, M. (2007). Presupposition and cooperation. MS, Carnegie Mellon University.
71. Simons, M., Tonhauser, J., Beaver, D., Roberts, C. (2010). What projects and why. In Li, N., & Lutz,
D. (Eds.) Proceedings of SALT 20 (pp. 309–327). Ithaca: CLC Publications.
72. Stalnaker, R. (1974). Pragmatic presuppositions. In Context and content: Essays on intentionality in
speech and thought (pp. 47–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
73. Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. In Context and content: Essays on intentionality in speech and thought
(pp. 78–95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
74. Stalnaker, R. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 701–721.
75. Stalnaker, R. (2010). Responses to Stanley and Schlenker. Philosophical Studies, 151, 143–157.
76. Stalnaker, R. (2014). Context. New York: Oxford University Press.
77. Stephenson, T. (2007). Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste.
Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 487–525.
78. Stevenson, C. (1937). The emotive meaning of ethical terms. Mind, 46, 14–31.
79. Stone, M., & Hardt, D. (1999). Dynamic discourse referents for tense and modals. In Bunt, H., &
Muskens, R. (Eds.) Computing meaning, Vol. 1 (pp. 301–319). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
80. Swanson, E. (2016). The application of constraint semantics to the language of subjective uncertainty.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45, 121–146.
81. Thomason, R..H. (2002). The beliefs of other agents. MS, University of Michigan.
82. Thomason, R.H., Stone, M., DeVault, D. (2006). Enlightened update: A computational architecture
for presupposition and other pragmatic phenomena. In Byron, D., Roberts, C., Schwenter, S. (Eds.)
Presupposition accommodation. OSU Pragmatics Initiative.
83. Tonhauser, J., Beaver, D., Roberts, C., Simons, M. (2013). Towards a taxonomy of projective content.
Language, 89, 66–109.
84. Traum, D. (1994). A computational theory of grounding in natural language conversation. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Rochester.
85. Trinh, T. (2014). How to ask the obvious: A presuppositional account of evidential bias in English
yes/no questions. In Crnicˇ, L., & Sauerland, U. (Eds.) The art and craft of semantics: A festschrift for
Irene Heim (Vol. 2, pp. 227–249). Cambridge: MITWPL.
86. Truckenbrodt, H. (2006). On the semantic motivation of syntactic verb movemenet to C in German.
Theoretical Linguistics, 32, 257–306.
87. Van Linden, A. (2012). Modal adjectives: English deontic and evaluative constructions in synchrony
and diachrony. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
88. Veltman, F. (1996). Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, 221–261.
89. Verstraete, J.-C. (2007). Rethinking the coordinate-subordinate dichotomy: Interpersonal grammar
and the analysis of adverbial clauses in English. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
90. Willer, M. (2013). Dynamics of epistemic modality. Philosophical Review, 122, 45–92.
91. von Wright, G.H. (1963). Norm and action: A logical inquiry. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
92. Yalcin, S. (2012). Bayesian expressivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112, 123–160.
93. Yalcin, S. (2012). Context probabilism. In Aloni, M., Kimmelman, V., Roelofsen, F., Sassoon, G.W.,
Schulz, K., Westera, M. (Eds.) Proceedings of the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium (pp. 12–21). Berlin:
Springer.
94. Zimmermann, M. (2011). Discourse particles. In Maienborn, C., von Heusinger, K., Portner, P. (Eds.)
Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning (Vol. 2, pp. 2011–2038). Berlin:
de Gruyter.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
